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The impact of capital regulatory shock on
bank ownership
Gonçalo Leónidas Rocha





For some years, researchers could not find a clear effect of capital adequacy on the risk
profile of banks, as shareholders could increase the riskiness of the assets (qualitative
effect), crowding-out the effect of reduced leverage (volume effect). Some shareholders
might have the will to increase the riskiness of the assets, but they may lack the power to
do so. Considering only ”powerful” shareholders, definitive conclusions were drawn
but with constant ownership profile. In this paper I investigate whether there is a sig-
nificant change in the type of shareholders in response to regulatory capital shocks
and, if so, will the banking system be in the hands of more “desired” shareholders. I
find that ownership profile responds to a regulatory shock, changing the risk appetite
of the ruling power at the bank. I find more banks and the government in the owner-
ship of undercapitalised banks and much less institutional shareholders and free float.
I claim that these new shareholders may not the desired ones, given the objective of
the regulatory change, as they are associated with a preference for more leverage. One
possible explanation for this crowding-out effect is that regulators are trying to contain
idiosyncratic risk (more linked to the riskiness of the assets) with a rule that contains
systematic risk (capital adequacy). This has a distorting effect on ownership. Another
insight can be drawn from the tests: supervisors should be aware of significant owner-
ship movements that cause the crowding-out.
JEL Classification: G280
Keywords: Bank, Regulation, Capital Adequacy, Ownership
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1 Introduction
Since the financial crisis of 2008, the finance world witnessed several changes in bank
regulation, most of them directed at preventing another similar crisis as the recent one,
not adequately prevented. I will address the impact of Basel III new capital adequacy
rules, trying to get some insight on the impact on risk profile and ownership changes.
The climax of the crisis hit precisely when banks were starting fulfilling capital re-
quirements of Basel II. Notwithstanding the fact that Basel II was not tested1, authori-
ties rushed to change the regulation into a more stricter definition of capital adequacy.
In Basel III, Core Tier I capital became central to the discussion, and no longer Tier I
+ Tier II. In this first moment, regulation called for more capital, without any material
change on the risk weights for the assets (in an IRB setting, this is a supervision issue).
This movement is global. However, Basel III allows for the incorporation of local ad-
justments on top of minimum requirements.
This change means that banks have to increase equity through seasoned offers, or make
a strong effort to reduce core capital consumption. By reducing leverage, this move
should reduce systematic risk as a first order effect.
According to Basel III, banks will face a revision of Tier I to Core Tier I (also re-
ferred as Common Equity). The threshold level changes are: from 2% to 3,5% in Jan
2013, 4% in Jan 2014, 4,5% in Jan 20152. Announcement was made in December
2010, but somehow anticipated (the guideline proposals were presented in December
2009 after a study of their impact done by survey on more than 250 banks in July 2009).
1Implementation of Basel II started in 2007. However, capital reduction was restricted by a pro-
vision in place in the first two years of Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach. As such, no bank had
achieved a significant capital saving before the crisis, even those few that started to implement IRB
models.
2There are additional buffers, with delayed implementation.
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In this paper, I study the impact of recent changes in bank capital regulation on own-
ership structures. The questions I try to answer are: Was there a significant change in
the type of shareholders in response to the recent capital regulatory shock? In case of
ownership change, is the banking system in the hands of more “desired” shareholders?
If a capital regulatory change commands an ownership structure reshuffling, it is pos-
sible the objective of the regulation to be enhanced or crowed-out by the new owners.
These movements should be incorporated on regulation design or in supervision tac-
tics.
This theme was already explored previously, mainly by Laeven & Levine (2009). The
new approach here is the study of the response to a change, instead of a more static
experiment developed by those authors.
I will explore the ownership of banks using two different approaches. In the first one,
I use the voting rights of each type of shareholder. This reveals the “will” that each
shareholder type places for the risk profile of the bank they own. However, that might
not lead to a risk change, as the investor type may lack the “power” to change profile.
In the second approach, I will use the controlling shareholder type, the one with the
power to influence the risk profile of the bank.
Controlling shareholders should influence the risk profile of the bank to maximise their
utility function. However, when there is a regulatory change, the easiest way to adapt
the risk profile (changing asset composition, leverage, and so on) may not be available,
and so I expect to see some changes in the preferred ownership. This is a crucial point:
an effective regulatory shock (to reduce bank risk) should contain the increase owner-
ship from “undesired” shareholders. If not contained, probably they will increase the
risk profile of the bank to protect the franchise.
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This is a good moment to study the impact of regulatory shocks: as most changes in
regulation are responses to the recent financial crisis, it can be safely said that shocks
were not anticipated before 2008, which is very convenient for this experiment. The-
ory suggests that highly capitalised bank should choose to operate at low levels of risk,
due to the capital at stake (effect ex-post). However, when banks have to call for more
capital, they have to promise more risk to shareholders (effect ex-ante). Since 2009-
2011 is a period of massive calling of funds, it is possible to set the best experimental
environment to test this ex-ante effect.
I expect financially unconstrained and diversified shareholders (mutual and pension
funds, for instance) to reduce their stake in undercapitalised banks. I claim that bank
returns are so poor after the crisis that even an unconstrained shareholder would in-
crease capital only as a last option to keep the going concern.
I also expect free float to step back of undercapitalised banks, as the capital call will
force this investor type outside of its preferred habitat.
I would expect banks to reduce significantly their stakes in other banks, mainly if they
are constrained by Basel rules. However, as part of the resolution process of several
banks, related banks were called to take over, most of the time with no capital increase
in the failed bank (the liquidity run on the acquired bank was stopped by the credibil-
ity added on the acquisition). And so the shock studied here might lead to an increase
in the banking share of ownership in other banks. This is exactly the opposite effect
desired by Basel regulators3.
Finally, I expect Government to step in at undercapitalised banks if risk strategy is
3Furthermore, bank concentration has negative side effects as it enhances the ”too big to fail” effect
and reduces competition.
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commanded by financially constrained or undiversified block-holders. Government
intervention is almost always done with some sort of capital strengthening. This re-
duces the leverage of the banks but the full impact on society may be questionable4.
I will examine ownership structure in two dimensions: identity / type of owner and
the level of ownership concentration.
At this point, I must clarify the concept of ownership desirability. A ”desired” owner,
from the regulatory perspective, is an investor with no will or power to increase the risk
profile of the bank he owns. From a society point of view, there are some more utility
dimensions and externalities to be considered5. In this paper, I am only concerned with
the risk profile of the bank, and so I expect diversified shareholders to increase the risk
profile of the bank and undiversified shareholders to command the opposite effect.
A major issue of existing literature is identification. Shareholders can invest on banks
that reveal the risk profile of their choice, or they can impose a risk profile on the
bank they own. As a first approach, I will consider that small shareholders will always
choose the bank with the desired risk profile, and they will sell if a regulatory shock
moves the risk profile away from their preferred habitat. For large shareholders, the
choice of the bank in the first place might be self-selected, but after a shock, I expected
them to influence the risk profile instead of selling. I expect small shareholders to re-
act mainly quantitatively (the number of shares owned) and large shareholders to react
4Government ownership is probably undesired on bank development grounds, as it seems to have a
negative impact on credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP (see Barth et al. (2000).). Even
in terms of bank safety, the expected effect may not be positive, as a paper from Iannotta et al. (2007)
presents evidence of higher insolvency risk for Government owned banks.
5After the global financial crisis, two dangers were frequntly referred: Too Big To Fail (TBTF) and
Too Big To Save (TBTS). TBTF banks force Governments to take control or to provide liquidity during
stress events, exposing taxpayers to large losses. This concern is specifically referred in the introduction
of Basel III ruling (see Basel (2010)). TBTS refers to very large and interconnected banks that cannot be
saved by their local governments. Bank stakes in other banks are further penalised in the new regulation:
stakes (above 10%) in banks are deducted from Common Equity Tier I instead of the previous split of
50%/50% between Tier I and Tier II. Stakes below 10% were also subject to a more stringent treatment
under Basel III.
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mainly qualitatively (on the risk profile).
Another identification problem is endogeneity: if a given shareholder intends to force
some risk enhancement on a bank, he may wish to buy stakes in other firms (banks or
not) to increase diversification. As such, the acquisition of stakes in later banks is not
directed by the will to increase risk. Considering that my database (to be presented
later) does not reveal any investor with a significant portfolio of controlling stakes in
several banks, I classify this concern as insignificant in this experiment.
Since the regulatory movement is global, for all banks, a control population is hard
to get. So, I will use for this purpose banks where the change is hardly limiting (they
were already largely complying).
I found that ownership profile responded to the recent capital regulatory shock, chang-
ing the risk appetite of the ruling power at the bank. I find more banks and the gov-
ernment in the ownership of undercapitalised banks and much less institutional share-
holders and free float. I claim that these new shareholders may not be the desired ones,
given the objective of the regulatory change.
Consistent with the results, there are some lessons to be learned by regulators. First
of all, some banks with ownership structures favouring risk increase should be more
closely monitored. Also, changes in ownership structure should be monitored and be
viewed as alert signs for supervision.
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2 Review of the Literature
There is a large body of literature relating bank regulation, risk profile and ownership
structures of banks. However, as far as I know, there is no paper studying the dynamic
impact6 of regulatory changes in risk profile of banks and ownership structure. Several
studies address the link between ownership and bank financial performance7, some-
times with links to some form of financial market regulation8. However, performance
is connected to risk through equity value volatility, whereas regulators are more con-
cerned with overall risk of the bank, most of the time studied using measures of asset
value volatility, Z-scores or ZP-scores9. Regulation impacts equity risk10 as a side ef-
fect, and so deals with the channel that impacts on shareholders preferences, affecting
ownership structure.
Koehn & Santomero (1980) found that the increase in capital adequacy requirements
have mixed effects of asset risk, but the dispersion of the probability of failure in-
creases. Their paper point to two main conclusions. First of all, regulators could
not achieve an unambiguous increase in bank safety demanding higher levels of cap-
ital as there was an asset reshuffling in response to the capital adequacy rule change.
Secondly, effective regulation should add restrictions on asset composition alongside
capital. The puzzle on the mixed impact might have been solve by Laeven & Levine
6In fact, I am really doing ”comparative statics”, as I cannot truly follow ownership in a dynamic
setting.
7See for instance Micco et al. (2007), Caprio Jr. et al. (2007) and Iannotta et al. (2007).
8La Porta et al. (1999) addresses the issue of Government ownership and the protection of property
rights.
9For Z-score, or the probability of bank failure, see Boyd & Graham (1986) and Barry et al. (2011).
The ZP score is an average Z-score weighted by the level of assets of each bank in a group (market, some
specific characteristics), and can be used to see the probability of failure between markets or between
banks with different characteristics (like the type of the major shareholder). See Goyeau & Tarazi (1992)
and again Barry et al. (2011).
10Barth et al. (1997) use a link between regulation (only restricted activities regulation) and equity
risk to address bank performance. However, no connection is made to ownership. Hassan et al. (2005)
use equity volatility to find that low levels of management ownership of the stock increases the risk of
the bank. When ownership is higher than 25%, the significance erodes. The link to regulatory issues
is made through differences in risk profile (that the authors do not support) between commercial banks
and savings & loans, or between state-chartered and national-chartered banks.
12
(2009) when they added a new dimension to the impact: differences in bank owner-
ship. These authors present a static approach between regulation, risk and ownership.
They found that the link between bank regulation, namely capital adequacy and the
stringency of its application, and the risk profile of the bank is significantly influenced
by the ownership structure of the bank. They found that capital requirements promote
safety with any type of ownership structure. However, this is done through an increase
in the capital/asset ratio, as the volatility of ROA is not affected11. The channel is the
valuation, which is a surprising conclusion. Safety comes from reduced competition,
or the return of the “3-6-3” rule! The new level of capital increases the set-up cost,
reducing the number of players or, at least, changing market shares in favour of a more
concentrated industry. This is hardly the aim of the regulator. For the authors, cap-
ital stringency12 has two effects: the direct effect promotes safety; the indirect effect
through interdependency with shareholding increases risk. Summing up, stringency
increases risk above a certain ownership threshold.
A more dynamic approach was used by Barry et al. (2011). Using ownership data for
European commercial banks, the authors analyse the link between ownership structure
and risk in both privately owned and publicly held (listed in a stock exchange) banks13.
They consider five categories of shareholders: managers, individuals/families, institu-
tional investors, non-financial firms and banks. The authors find that ownership ex-
plains risk differences mainly for privately owned banks (the market monitoring makes
it harder for a shareholder to influence the risk profile of the bank). A higher equity
stake of either individuals/families or banks decreases asset risk and default risk. In
11This is an interesting point for regulation: capital adequacy is a regulatory response to a problem:
risky assets. As the authors show, the remedy is not addressing the origins of the problem, just increasing
the tolerance to a bad outcome.
12Stringency here is the tightness of capital adequacy application. For instance, an 8% rule on assets
plus off-balance items is more difficult to overcome than an 8% on risk-weighted assets computed with
internal methods.
13A similar paper from Iannotta et al. (2007) find higher risk on Government and privately owned
banks when comparing to mutual banks. However, they removed significant changes in ownership from
the database, and have no link to regulatory environment.
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addition, institutional investors and non-financial companies impose riskier strategies
when holding higher stakes. For publicly held banks, changes in ownership do not
affect risk taking. Market forces seem to align the risk-taking behaviour of publicly
held banks, such that ownership structure is no longer a determinant in explaining risk
differences. However, higher stakes of banking institutions in publicly held banks are
associated with lower credit and default risk (need to rescue if things go wrong). The
paper gives a strong support for understanding links between ownership and risk14;
however, the impact of regulation is not addressed.
Barth et al. (2000) present an empirical study linking regulation environment in US
and Europe and the impact of bank efficiency and fragility. Although not directly ad-
dressed, there is somehow an “event study” on the impact of changing regulation. In
this paper, ownership structure is not addressed. In a similar way, Demirgüç-Kunt et al.
(2004) examine the impact of bank regulation on interest margins and operating costs
(finding it is not significant after controlling for country specific characteristics).
Saunders et al. (1990) present a paper relating regulation, risk and ownership (manage-
rially controlled or shareholder controlled banks). The approach to risk distinguishes
systematic and diversifiable risk, since these two types of risk have very different im-
pacts on shareholder types. Some dynamics of regulation is granted to the analysis
by considering structural shifts in regressions to address major regulatory stances of
the seventies and eighties. The idea of the study is more in line with ours but consid-
ers very broad concepts of regulation, ownership and risk. One interesting aspect of
this paper, that deals only with management ownership, is that managers, when they
have a relatively large stake on the bank, but not enough to represent a big portions
of their wealth, behave like diversified shareholders. However, only the idiosyncratic
risk increases, not the systematic risk. The channel is asset reshuffle and not increased
14Faccio et al. (2011) present a similar evidence for non banking firms. They found that large
diversified shareholders tend to command riskier projects in the firm.
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leverage.
Beltratti & Stulz (2009) published some evidence on the impact of several bank charac-
teristics on stock market performance following Lehman bankruptcy. Some regulation
variables are used, but bank characteristics are not dynamic. There is almost no studied
relationship between changes in regulation and bank characteristics. There is only a
mild reference (it is not empirically supported, only a possible explanation) that strong
supervision authorities led to worse performance, maybe because they demanded more
capital for each dollar of write-downs, something that was also not studied. However,
main conclusions seem to point that shareholder-friendly boards lead to worse per-
formance (probably due to a riskier profile during a bad state of the world). On the
other hand, banks with more capital15, more deposits-to-assets and loans-to-assets per-
formed better. These characteristics are the target of most bank regulation nowadays.
Tsai et al. (2009) analyse the link between dominant ownership (foreign or domes-
tic, private or Government) and poor diversification. The paper founds that domestic
private ownership limits bad diversification but not good one. Government limits any
type of diversification, with positive impact in bad times, but restricting performance in
good times. This paper has some link between ownership, risk and different moments
in time. However, ownership rotation is not considered, nor behaviour is the response
to a regulatory shock.
The present analysis stands out as the first to dynamically address the impact of chang-
ing capital regulation on risk profiles and ownership structures. This is of major im-
portance for regulators, giving insights over the outcome of the planned moves within
Basel III.
15This effect is more evident through equity than tier 1. This is an issue of capital quality, or the
concept of capital stringency presented by Laeven & Levine (2009).
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3 Data and Summary Statistics
I used a sample of the largest banks in the world by total assets16. The use of total
assets as the ranking variable instead of market value is needed to include listed and
non-listed banks. The database covers 234 ”independent”17 banks, each of them with
more than 40 bn USD of assets by 2006. As much as possible, I will try to avoid the
“ survival bias ” by using the list of top banks in December 2006; however, some data
is missing in subsequent years and may determined the exclusion of the exiting bank
from some tests18.
Ownership data is mainly collected from Factset (including institutional and insider
ownership), a data service from Thompson Reuters. The information is complemented
with BankScope Fitch IBCA, the annual reports of the banks and some Form 10-K
filings to the Securities and Exchange Commission. I have also relied on Factset to
consolidate ownership by investor group. Changes in ownership were considered on
an annual basis. This option avoids noise and makes comparable different data sources,
namely annual reports.
For the major shareholder group to be considered a controlling one, a minimum thresh-
old for the voting rights was defined. Lins et al. (2011) use 25% for such threshold
whereas Laeven & Levine (2009) use a 10% limit for the voting rights, directly or
indirectly owned. Caprio Jr. et al. (2007) use 5%. Considering that the database in-
cludes the largest banking groups in the world, I opted for the smaller value. A bank
16See the list of all banks considered in Appendix 1.
17The concept of independency here means they are not controlled by another bank in the database,
and so I avoid double counting.
18As an example, Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch are not included in the database from 2008
onward. The first no longer exists as a bank and the second is no longer ”independent” in the concept
used here, as it is fully owned by Bank of America, also included in the database
16
is considered controlled by a shareholder if he is the largest one with more than 5% of
the voting rights. If no investor has more than 5%, the bank is considered widely held.
I will not consider in these stakes shares owned by the bank itself or its subsidiaries
(as treasury stock usually does not vote or receive dividends), but I will consider other
autonomous vehicles as their own mutual and pension funds.
I have considered 15 types of shareholders: brokers, banks, employees, financial con-
glomerates, foundations, free float, families, government, non-financial firms, insur-
ance companies, mutual & pension funds, private banks, private equity, sovereign
funds19 and trusts & nominees. Not all types are sufficiently represented as controlling
shareholder of the list of banks, but they are sufficiently different from one another not
to recommend a broader aggregation.
The dataset has an yearly average of 87 trillion USD in bank assets and the owner-
ship is divided among investor types as follows:
19A Government has an incentive to reduce the risk of the bank, as it faces unlimited liability as a
lender of last resort or in terms of deposit insurance. Furthermore, it is the natural candidate to rescue
a bank in a bailout. However, a foreign Government does not face that liability. It can force higher risk
on a diversified portfolio, or it can use a more arms-length approach and let the vehicle to decide. The
approach used here is to make a group of its own.
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Table 1
This table reports the share of each investor type on the ownership of all banks. Sample consists of the
largest 234 banks in the world, all with total assets in 2006 above USD 40 bn.
Investor % of common equity 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Broker 1,1% 1,8% 1,1% 0,8% 1,0% 1,1%
Bank 9,1% 10,6% 12,5% 10,2% 9,1% 9,0%
Employee 0,5% 0,6% 0,5% 0,5% 0,5% 0,4%
Financial Conglomerate 1,4% 1,3% 1,3% 1,4% 1,3% 1,4%
Foundation 2,5% 2,7% 2,8% 2,9% 2,3% 1,8%
Free Float 39,6% 35,1% 32,8% 31,0% 30,9% 31,0%
Family 1,4% 1,7% 1,4% 1,2% 1,1% 1,1%
Government 12,4% 11,4% 15,8% 19,3% 19,1% 19,5%
Non-Financial Firm 1,9% 1,8% 2,1% 2,5% 2,8% 3,0%
Insurance Company 2,6% 2,5% 1,7% 1,6% 1,5% 1,4%
Mutual & Pension Fund 24,0% 26,2% 23,1% 23,3% 23,9% 23,8%
Private Banking 0,5% 0,5% 0,4% 0,4% 0,4% 0,4%
Private Equity 0,4% 0,3% 0,4% 0,5% 0,5% 0,4%
Sovereign Funds 0,7% 0,9% 1,5% 1,7% 2,3% 2,4%
Trust & Nominees 2,0% 2,3% 2,5% 2,7% 3,2% 3,4%
As it can be seen, 84% of assets are on the hands of just four investor types. The
most striking effect is the increase in government share and a mirror decrease in free
float after the crisis. The unfolding of a systemic bank crisis last for three years on
average20, and so I would expect the government ownership to decrease only after the
end of our period of data (however, it can last for several years, as seen on the Japanese
crisis of the nineties).
Tests are concentrated on just the four main investor types, as those are the ones with
sufficient variability and representation to return robust insights. In figure 1, I present
20See Laeven & Valencia (2008).
18
the evolution of the average ownership. The trend is split into two groups: the own-
ership on high-leverage banks (the 50% banks that present an average leverage ratio
above the sample median for the pre-shock period, or 2006-2008) and on low-leverage
banks.
Throughout the sample period, Banks and Free Float prefer high leverage banks, whereas
Mutual & Pension Funds prefer low leverage banks. Governments changed (or they
were forced to change by the need to rescue troubled banks) their ownership preference
in 2008. The financial crisis of 2008 and the capital regulatory shock may contribute
to explain the dynamics, and in this paper I will try to separate the effect of each of the
two explanations.
Figure 1. Ownership evolution of some investor types
Variables used are referred and explained in Appendix 2. In Table 2, I present some
summary statistics for the variables used. Each record contains information on a spe-
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cific bank and a specific year (using 234 banks and 6 years, a maximum of 1404 records
can be achieved but I do not have full information on all variables for all records).
Table 2
This table reports summary statistics of the main regression variables. Sample consists of the largest
234 banks in the world, all with total assets in 2006 above USD 40 bn. Statistics are based on annual
data for the years 2006 to 2011. The meaning of all variables is detailed on appendix 2.
Variables Mean Max Min Std Dev # records
Asset Profitability 0,4% 5,7% -24,5% 1,34% 1 291
Beta 1,03 5,18 -0,23 0,65 957
Credit Rights 2,02 4,00 0,00 0,95 1 282
ROA Volatility 0,61% 10,77% 0,01% 1,05% 1 288
Earnings Volatility 482% 19600% 3% 1905% 1 288
Equity Profitability 6% 1707% -1199% 74% 1 290
GDP per capita 34 380 114 508 820 17 055 1 294
Idiosyncratic Risk 0,3% 9,4% -0,1% 0,57% 957
Leverage 21,18 514,19 -259,57 23,48 1 290
Loan to Deposits Gap 1,37 245,62 -0,99 11,59 1 266
Price Volatility 0,45% 10,01% 0,00% 0,79% 957
Ownership of controlling shareholder 48,1% 100,0% 5,0% 36,28% 1 294
Av. Revenue Growth 3,81% 372,31% -277,26% 34,75% 1 222
Percentage of Fee Income 28,8% 130,6% -66,7% 18,36% 1 285
Size of Assets 402 467 3 654 046 40 293 580 630 1 294
Own. Broker Type 0,6% 14,8% 0,0% 1,5% 1 294
Own. Bank Type 9,4% 100,0% 0,0% 23,5% 1 294
Own. Employee Type 0,3% 11,6% 0,0% 1,2% 1 294
Own. Financial Conglomerate Type 1,6% 100,0% 0,0% 10,1% 1 294
Own. Foundation Type 4,5% 100,0% 0,0% 18,3% 1 294
Own. Free Float Type 33,1% 100,0% 0,0% 27,1% 1 294
Own. Family Type 3,7% 100,0% 0,0% 13,7% 1 294
Own. Government Type 16,1% 100,0% 0,0% 32,5% 1 294
Own. Non-Financial Firm Type 3,1% 99,9% 0,0% 9,6% 1 294
Own. Insurance Company Type 2,1% 100,0% 0,0% 5,6% 1 294
Own. Mutual & Pension Fund Type 19,7% 92,4% 0,0% 23,0% 1 294
Own. Private Banking Type 0,2% 6,6% 0,0% 0,6% 1 294
Own. Private Equity Type 2,0% 100,0% 0,0% 12,9% 1 294
Own. Sovereign Fund Type 1,6% 99,8% 0,0% 6,5% 1 294
Own. Trust & Nominees Type 1,9% 87,0% 0,0% 8,6% 1 294
WGI Index 6,13 11,41 -4,58 3,73 1 294
Z score 28,54 466,51 -39,41 41,16 1 282
Z1 score 2,25 26,16 -0,79 2,97 1 282
Z2 score 26,30 464,43 -41,61 39,48 1 282
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Appendix 3 presents the correlation matrix among variables. I decided to drop the
split of Z score into Z1 and Z2: Z1 has no time variability by construction and Z2 is
strongly correlated with the Z score. The WGI Index is strongly correlated with GDP
per capita, and was also dropped. Price Volatility, Beta and Idiosyncratic Risk are also
not used to avoid removing non-listed banks from the regressions.
4 Methodology and Empirical Tests
4.1 Methodology
I use a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) methodology to address the first question: Was
there a significant change in the type of shareholders in response to regulatory shocks?
The test uses a regression equation of the following type:
OwnerTypei,t = ↵ +   ⇥ µt +   ⇥Di,t +   ⇥ µt ⇥Di,t + ✓Ci,t + ✏i,t (1)
The subscript i denotes the bank and the subscript t denotes the year. OwnerType is
the percentage combined stake of all shareholders of a given type. I use one regression
equation for each investor type. The µ variable takes a value of one for the years after
the shock (2009 to 2011) and zero otherwise; the variable is not used in fixed effect
models. C represents a matrix of time control variables for the country and the bank.
Control variables on banks and country of incorporation are explained in detail in ap-
pendix 2. I did not use market variables to keep non-listed banks in the sample.
The variable under investigation is D, which is a dummy that takes the value of 1
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if the bank in question does not comply with the capital adequacy rule (and so it will
suffer a ”treatment”). It will take the value zero otherwise21.
The D dummy variable uses the leverage ratio (assets over equity). The lower this
ratio, the less restricted the new ruling is for the bank. The top 50% banks in terms
of leverage ratio are considered ”high-leveraged” and so subject to ”treatment” (D
dummy equal to 1). I prefer to use a ”crude” leverage ratio measure that is consistent22
over the entire sample, as reported Tier I or Core Capital are not consistent: most banks
disclose the ratio according to the rule of its home country regulator. Furthermore, the
change in the formula from Basel I to Basel II was not used for all banks starting in
the same year. In the end, I expect a significant correlation among the two possible
variables in this sample of largest banks in the world.
4.2 Effect on total ownership of investor types
Table 3 shows the test results. Some of the investor types had no sufficient observa-
tions to build a significant model. Banks, as shareholders, prefer high leverage banks
to invest, and their preference was not affected in the post-crisis years or due to the
capital regulatory shock. Free float reveals no preference or reaction to the crisis or
the shock. Governments show no prior preference but react strongly to the regula-
tory shock, increasing their stakes on undercapitalised banks. However, the reaction
to the crisis was not significant. Finally, mutual and pension funds had a prior pref-
erence for low leverage banks and reacted negatively to the new capital adequacy rules.
My interpretation is that ownership rotation was a response to weak solvency, with
21See Appendix 5 for a proof that this coefficient delta is in fact the DiD estimator.
22Even with this measure, accounting standards can put consistency into question. However, the use
of the largest banks in the world mitigates accounting standards differences.
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the government rescuing the system. Institutional investors were more reluctant to
convey new capital to a low profitability industry.
This conclusion has evident implications for the stability of the banking system: when
some resolution effort is needed, not all investors are eager to do it. And the candidate
for the resolution is the taxpayer23.
4.3 Effect on leverage
Then I regress Leverage on ownership of the various investor types for the years before
the shock24. With this test I try to see to which investor type is a safer bank associated
with.
The test uses a regression equation of the following type:
Leveragei,t = ↵ +   ⇥OwnerTypei,t + ✓Ci,t + ✏i,t (2)
As previously, the subscript i denotes the bank, the subscript t denotes the year and
OwnerType is the percentage combined stake of all shareholders of a given type. Lever-
age is the Assets/Equity ratio, taken from the reported balance sheets of the banks. C
represents a matrix of time control variables for the country and the bank.
23Government ownership is also “undesirable” due to its effects of future bank safety. As Laeven &
Valencia (2010) point out, in a pre-crisis period, government ownership is linked to poor asset quality
and it is one of the usual initial conditions to the crisis. Also, Brandao Marques et al. (2013) show that
Government support is linked to reduced market discipline and margins increase (the enhanced charter
value due to higher margins seems not to command less risk taking as a strategy to preserve value).
24Z score would probably be a better choice, as it uses also earnings volatility and not just leverage.
However, since this variable uses an average of profits, I would remove half of the annual observa-
tions to consider only the pre-crisis period. The Z-score would be more influenced by the number of
observations than by the volatility of the period.
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Results are in Table 4. Banks are associated with higher leverage, whereas Govern-
ment and Institutional Investors seem to command low leveraged banks.
The more interesting feature is that the Government has a clear preference for low
leverage banks (the ex-ante effect) but had to increase the stake on undercapitalized
banks is response to the capital regulatory shock. Evidence shows Governments acted
reluctantly to the regulation. Institutional Investors were the main supporters of low
leverage banks, and they reacted negatively to the regulatory shock. For the free float,
they seem to prefer under capitalised banks but reacted negatively to the shock. How-
ever, results are not statistically significant.
4.4 Effect of controlling shareholders
These investor types can have the will to influence the risk profile of the bank they own,
but they may not have the power to do so. As such, I repeated the test considering only
the ownership percentage of the controlling shareholder. The test uses a regression
equation of the following type:
Leveragei,t = ↵ +   ⇥ ControlStakei,t +   ⇥ InvestorTypei,t+
+   ⇥ ControlStakei,t ⇥ InvestorTypei,t + ✓Ci,t + ✏i,t (3)
ControlStake represents the percentage ownership of the controlling shareholder, de-
fined as the major shareholder with at least 5% of the voting rights. When no such
shareholder exists for a given bank and year, I used the free float percentage owner-
ship25. InvestorType is a vector of dummy variables that takes the vale of 1 for the
25This can have a confusing effect on the   coefficient of the regression, as for this Free Float investor
type a lower value means a larger stake from other investor types. As such a lower ControlStake value
in Free Float means more ”will” from other investor types, contrasting to less will on all other types.
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investor type controlling the bank in any given year and zero for all other types. Re-
sults are presented in Table 5.
It is fair to say that, when the controlling shareholder is Free Float, it is in fact the
management that controls the banks, with the power and the will to shape the risk
profile to its own preferences. It is exactly the management, plus the Mutual & Pen-
sion Funds that impose a lower leverage to the banks they control. And they are the
investors selling their bank shares in response to the capital regulatory shock. The
Government commands a higher leverage when it controls the bank.
An interesting issue is that the percentage ownership does not command a different
leverage profile when the controlling party is the management or a Mutual or Pen-
sion Fund (when the investor has the power to move the risk profile into his preferred
habitat, there is no “grading” of the will). Only the Government seems to prefer less
leverage when its stake increases. One significant investor group (banks) was removed
from the model to avoid collinearity. And so, I can infer that banks do command higher
leverage when they control other banks.
4.5 Alternative risk variables
I performed some other tests (not shown) with different variables for risk, like Z score,
beta, idiosyncratic risk or price volatility. The first one has a problem of the standard
deviation of profits (I have to remove half of the observations to use only the pre-crisis
period) and the others need a market for the shares, which also excludes a lot of banks
and most occurrences of some investor types.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper, I perform a test of the impact of a capital regulatory shock on the owner-
ship profile of banks.
For some years, researchers could not find a clear effect of strict capital adequacy
on the risk profile of the banks. At the time, the intuition was that shareholders could
impose an increase in the riskiness of the assets, crowding-out the effect of reduced
leverage.
When the ownership dimension was added, it becomes apparent that some sharehold-
ers might have the will to increase the riskiness of the assets, but they need the power
to do so. As such, only diversified block-holders would fight for that. Previous studies,
that did not address the ownership profile, could not capture this effect and produced
inconclusive results relating capital adequacy and risk profile.
A regulatory recommendation was to take a closer look to financial institutions where
diversified block-holders had the power and the will to increase risk even when lever-
age was reduced.
Our contribution to the discussion is to claim that there are no specific ownership
profile that can place a financial institution outside of the supervisor scrutiny. The
problem is that different shareholders will move in and out, changing the risk appetite
of the ruling power at the bank.
The answer to our first question (was there a significant change in the type of share-
holders in response to the recent capital regulatory shock?) is clearly affirmative: there
is a significant change in the type of shareholders as a response to this regulatory shock.
I find more banks and the government in the ownership list, and much less institutional
26
shareholders and free float. At this moment, I cannot say that this is a permanent effect
(low demand for low leverage banks, if the new rule makes the business less attractive)
or a more temporary one (the low demand is due to the uncertainty over the time length
of the bad state of the world), as I would need a lot more post-crisis data.
As for our second question (is the banking system in the hands of more “desired”
shareholders?), I claim that these new shareholders are not the desired ones, not in reg-
ulatory terms nor even for the society. It is not clear that Banks and the Government
are associated with less risk profile of the banks they own (evidence suggests the oppo-
site). For the society, bank concentration and government control may not be desired
either.
One possible explanation for this crowding-out effect is that regulators are trying to
contain idiosyncratic risk (more linked to the riskiness of the assets) with a rule that
contains systematic risk (capital adequacy). This has a distorting effect on owner-
ship. Another insight claims that supervisors should be aware of significant ownership
movements that cause the crowding-out.
Future research should address this same effect on other regulatory rules, like deposit
insurance, liquidity levels, activity restriction, and the discriminatory capital adequacy
levels for G-SIFI. Also, the impact of the regulation on the riskiness of assets deserves



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This table reports results of a linear regression of Leverage, as the dependent variable, on
several regressors. Independent variables are the Percentage Ownership of the Control-
ling Shareholder, Investor Types, as a factor, the cross effect of the Percentage Ownership
of the Controlling Shareholder with Investor Types, and a set of control variables. Sample
consists of the largest 234 banks in the world, all with total assets in 2006 above USD 40
bn. Statistics are based on annual data for the years 2006 to 2008. In each year, a control-
ling shareholder type is attributed to each bank, being the bank considered widely-held if
the major shareholder has less than 5% of the voting rights. The meaning of all variables
is detailed on Appendix 2. T-stats for each coefficient are reported in parenthesis. *, **





% Ownership of the Controlling Owner 14,76 14,7
(5,073) *** (5,053) ***
Bank / Bank Holding Company
FreeFloat -13,07 -13,06
(-2,864) *** (-2,862) ***
Public authority, State, Government 9,943 10,28
(3,571) *** (3,682) ***
Mutual & Pension Fund -6,985 -7,022
(-2,391) ** (-2,403) *
Cross Effects: Investor Type * % Ownership





Public authority, State, Government -22,53 -22,87
(-5,380) *** (-5,457) ***
Mutual & Pension Fund 5,513 6,163
(0,290) (0,324)
Credit Rights -34,8 -34,29
(-5,281) *** (-5,191) ***
GDP per Capita 2,249 2,249
(4,035) *** (4,032) ***
Asset Profitability 0,0001046 -1,292
(2,811) *** (-1,011)
Loan to Deposits Gap -218,4 -225,5
(-2,619) *** (-2,627) ***
Percentage of Fee Income 0,02379 0,02345
(0,682) (0,672)
Log of Size of Assets 0,04702 -0,03339
(0,015) (-0,011)
Earnings Volatility 4,055 4,092
(7,617) *** (7,681) ***
Equity Profitability -0,02972 -0,02998
(-1,119) (-1,129)
Growth in Revenues (pre crisis) -9,994 -10
(-4,315) *** (-4,321) ***




R Square 0,3928 0,3954
F Statistic 12,03 *** 11,41 ***
# Independent variables 32 34
# Degrees of Freedom 595 593
# Observations 627 627
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Appendices
Appendix 1 - List of Banks
Rank Bank Country Assets 2006 Assets 2011
1 Deutsche Bank DE 2 091 055 2 804 894
2 Japan Post bank JP 2 080 882 2 546 092
3 Barclays Plc GB 1 952 506 2 430 190
4 UBS CH 1 925 033 1 512 805
5 BNP Paribas FR 1 900 821 2 547 203
6 Citigroup US 1 884 167 1 873 878
7 HSBC Holdings Plc GB 1 860 758 2 555 579
8 Credit Agricole FR 1 821 059 2 436 067
9 Royal Bank of Scotland Group GB 1 706 961 2 342 123
10 ING Group NL 1 618 357 1 658 007
11 Mitsubishi UFJ Financial JP 1 586 843 2 798 108
12 Bank of America US 1 459 737 2 129 046
13 JP Morgan Chase US 1 351 520 2 265 792
14 ABN Amro NL 1 302 628 524 508
15 Societe Generale FR 1 262 743 1 531 176
16 Mizuho Financial JP 1 258 861 2 150 052
17 HBOS - Halifax Bank of Scotland GB 1 159 243 0
18 Morgan Stanley US 1 121 192 749 898
19 Banco Santander ES 1 100 462 1 622 102
20 UniCredit IT 1 086 488 1 201 185
21 Credit Suisse CH 1 029 388 1 118 394
22 Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) CN 962 105 2 458 597
23 Sumitomo Mitsui Financial JP 847 122 1 859 845
24 Merrill Lynch US 841 299 555 788
25 Goldman Sachs US 838 201 923 225
26 Commerzbank AG DE 802 744 857 711
27 Intesa Sanpaolo IT 761 182 828 494
28 Dexia Group BE 747 931 534 977
29 Rabobank NL 734 354 948 311
30 Dresdner Bank AG DE 732 298 0
31 Wachovia Corporation US 707 121 0
32 China Construction Bank CN 698 124 1 951 046
33 Agricultural Bank of China CN 687 248 1 855 056
34 Bank of China CN 683 199 1 879 280
35 Lloyds Banking Group GB 673 040 1 508 520
36 Natixis FR 605 258 658 046
37 Norinchukin Bank JP 573 174 939 577
38 National Westminster Bank GB 569 347 571 286
39 DZ Bank AG DE 556 496 526 121
40 Landesbank Baden-Wurttemberg DE 550 691 483 522
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Appendix 1 - List of Banks (cont.)
Rank Bank Country Assets 2006 Assets 2011
41 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria ES 543 272 774 663
42 Lehman Brothers US 503 545 0
43 Danske Bank DK 484 808 597 210
44 Wells Fargo US 481 996 1 313 867
45 Bayerische Landesbank DE 466 142 400 682
46 Royal Bank Canada CA 460 479 736 025
47 Nordea Bank SE 457 791 928 272
48 Banque Federative du Credit Mutuel FR 447 411 495 369
49 KfW Bankengruppe DE 441 293 641 334
50 KBC Group BE 429 430 369 884
51 National Australia Bank AU 382 253 769 511
52 Bear Stearns US 350 433 0
53 Washington Mutual US 346 288 0
54 Toronto Dominion Bank CA 337 063 672 045
55 Resona Holdings JP 335 845 561 693
56 Bank of Nova Scotia CA 325 132 563 259
57 Commonwealth Bank of Australia AU 301 877 681 858
58 Nomura Holdings JP 301 305 464 144
59 China Development Bank CN 296 530 993 091
60 EuroHypo DE 296 051 263 084
61 Depfa IE 294 221 0
62 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken (SEB) SE 282 462 343 050
63 Fortis Bank Nederland NL 276 806 0
64 La Caixa ES 275 980 366 026
65 BMO - Bank of Montreal CA 274 494 467 466
66 Nationwide Building Society GB 269 098 304 843
67 Standard Chartered GB 266 102 599 070
68 ANZ Banking AU 263 864 606 913
69 Svenska Handelsbanken SE 261 372 356 366
70 Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC) CA 260 774 346 322
71 Norddeutsche Landesbank DE 257 171 295 031
72 HSH Nordbank DE 256 472 176 148
73 Cassa Depositi e Prestiti IT 249 530 372 166
74 Bank of Ireland IE 249 177 200 740
75 Deutsche Postbank AG DE 243 995 248 828
76 Erste Group AT 239 793 272 189
77 Westpac Banking AU 237 702 684 236
78 BPCE - Banque Populaire et Caisse d’Epargne FR 230 428 1 475 474
79 Woori Financial Group KR 228 379 270 090
80 Bank of Communications CN 220 319 0
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Appendix 1 - List of Banks (cont.)
Rank Bank Country Assets 2006 Assets 2011
81 U.S. Bancorp US 219 232 340 122
82 Shinkin Central Bank JP 219 062 393 297
83 DnB NOR NO 211 727 355 826
84 Kookmin Bank KR 210 291 222 544
85 Helaba - Landesbank Hessen Thuringen DE 209 810 212 541
86 Banca Monte Dei Paschi di Siena IT 209 246 311 974
87 Allied Irish Banks (AIB) IE 209 207 177 113
88 Countrywide Financial Corporation US 199 946 0
89 Northern Rock Building Society GB 197 860 30 144
90 Swedbank AB SE 197 560 269 640
91 Shinhan Financial Group KR 191 459 248 785
92 Landesbank Berlin (LBB) DE 186 903 170 016
93 SunTrust Bank US 182 162 176 859
94 Capitalia IT 180 973 0
95 Bankia ES 180 736 386 713
96 NRW.BANK DE 178 888 197 715
97 Nykredit Realkredit A/S DK 169 398 242 920
98 Citizens Financial US 160 831 129 654
99 State Bank of India IN 157 441 310 543
100 Capital One US 149 739 206 019
101 La Banque Postale FR 148 268 240 701
102 Regions Financial US 143 369 127 050
103 National City Corporation US 140 191 0
104 Banco Brasil BR 138 717 525 621
105 Standard Bank Group ZA 137 265 185 096
106 Alliance & Leicester Plc GB 134 289 0
107 Sberbank of Russia RU 131 685 337 153
108 DBS Group SG 128 347 262 878
109 Caixa Geral de DepÛsitos PT 127 016 156 264
110 Hana Financial Group KR 125 070 153 898
111 Bradesco BR 124 296 386 805
112 BB&T Corp. US 121 351 174 579
113 Daiwa Securities Group JP 121 042 246 054
114 Banco Popular Espanol ES 120 951 169 693
115 China Merchants Bank CN 119 688 443 999
116 Bank Nederlandse Gemeenten NL 118 902 176 866
117 China CITIC Bank CN 118 800 0
118 Industrial Bank of Korea KR 114 051 160 587
119 Desjardins Group CA 110 783 186 172
120 Landwirtschaftliche Rentenbank DE 109 165 115 193
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Appendix 1 - List of Banks (cont.)
Rank Bank Country Assets 2006 Assets 2011
121 Macquarie Bank AU 107 543 156 837
122 State Street US 107 353 216 673
123 Cathay Financial Holdings TW 105 817 165 331
124 SNS Reaal NL 105 236 171 311
125 United Overseas Bank Limited UOB SG 104 898 182 753
126 Bancaja ES 104 879 0
127 Millennium bcp PT 104 316 121 162
128 Bank of New York Mellon US 103 206 325 266
129 PNC Financial Services US 101 820 271 205
130 National Bank of Greece GR 100 837 138 514
131 Fifth Third Bancorp US 100 669 116 967
132 Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation Limited OCBC SG 98 335 214 220
133 Itau Unibanco BR 98 152 456 038
134 UBI Banca IT 98 033 168 239
135 Anglo Irish Bank IE 96 721 71 987
136 Banco Sabadell ES 96 048 130 176
137 Bank of Yokohama JP 95 768 166 456
138 China Minsheng Banking Corp CMBC CN 92 906 354 101
139 Shoko Chukin Bank Ltd JP 92 364 160 233
140 KeyCorp US 92 337 88 785
141 Shinsei Bank Limited JP 91 027 111 945
142 Banco Popolare IT 90 657 173 842
143 Banco Popolare di Verona e Novara IT 90 657 0
144 Sovereign Bank US 89 642 0
145 Caixa Catalunya ES 89 148 99 188
146 ICICI Bank Limited IN 89 075 113 859
147 Oesterreichische Volksbanken AG AT 88 986 53 315
148 Shanghai Pudong Development Bank CN 88 328 426 480
149 Myanma Economic Bank MM 88 250 0
150 Hang Seng Bank HK 86 020 125 610
151 FirstRand Banking Group ZA 86 011 86 270
152 St. George Bank Limited AU 84 371 0
153 IKB Deutsche Industriebank DE 83 860 40 949
154 Caja de Ahorros del Mediterraneo CAM ES 82 143 0
155 Chiba Bank Ltd. JP 81 782 141 942
156 Espı́rito Santo Financial Group (ESFG) PT 81 652 108 898
157 Hokuhoku Financial Group JP 80 952 138 205
158 Industrial Bank CN 79 116 0
159 OP-Pohjola Group FI 78 568 119 613
160 Banco Espı́rito Santo PT 78 046 103 995
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Appendix 1 - List of Banks (cont.)
Rank Bank Country Assets 2006 Assets 2011
161 Zurich Cantonal Bank CH 78 030 142 841
162 CIT Group, Inc US 77 486 45 235
163 China Everbright Bank Co CN 76 381 275 353
164 Raiffeisen Bank International (RZB Group) AT 73 728 190 507
165 Shizuoka Bank JP 73 290 126 063
166 Taiwan Cooperative Bank TW 72 849 91 037
167 Taishin Financial Holding Co., Ltd TW 71 534 86 605
168 EFG Eurobank Ergasias GR 71 026 99 569
169 Britannia Building Society GB 68 850 0
170 Mega Financial Holding Company TW 68 697 86 487
171 Bank Leumi Le Israel IL 68 597 95 786
172 Bank Hapoalim IL 67 061 93 386
173 BAWAG PSK Group AT 67 049 53 240
174 Verband der Sparda-Banken e.V. DE 66 061 0
175 Alpha Bank GR 65 721 76 662
176 Malayan Banking Berhad - Maybank MY 63 118 130 359
177 Joyo Bank Ltd. JP 62 529 104 086
178 Mediobanca IT 60 861 97 716
179 Bankinter ES 60 806 77 106
180 Northern Trust US 60 712 100 224
181 Banca Popolare dell’Emilia Romagna IT 59 727 78 398
182 Turkiye is Bankasi A.S. - ISBANK TR 58 569 97 218
183 Nishi-Nippon City Bank Ltd JP 58 398 99 739
184 Comerica US 58 001 61 008
185 North Fork Bank US 57 903 0
186 Arion Banki hf IS 57 134 7 287
187 Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company US 57 065 77 924
188 Hua Xia Bank co., Limited CN 57 011 197 640
189 Land Bank of Taiwan TW 56 725 75 515
190 Caja de Ahorros de Galicia - Caixa Galicia ES 56 500 93 625
191 M&I LLC - Marshall & Ilsley Corporation US 56 230 0
192 Aozora Bank JP 54 964 66 278
193 Banque et Caisse d’Epargne de l’Etat Luxembourg LU 54 448 51 508
194 Bank of Kyoto JP 54 087 95 687
195 Banca Popolare di Milano IT 53 027 67 308
196 Fubon Financial Holding Co Ltd TW 52 930 119 509
197 Banca Lombarda e Piemontese SpA IT 52 457 0
198 VTB Bank RU 52 403 211 270
199 Chinatrust Financial Holding Company TW 52 379 66 709
200 Hiroshima Bank Ltd JP 51 841 86 474
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Appendix 1 - List of Banks (cont.)
Rank Bank Country Assets 2006 Assets 2011
201 Hua Nan Financial Holdings Co Ltd TW 51 399 65 236
202 CorealCredit Bank AG DE 51 241 12 597
203 Hachijuni Bank JP 51 042 85 831
204 T.C. Ziraat Bankasi A.S. TR 50 722 86 085
205 North Pacific Bank-Hokuyo Bank JP 50 407 100 202
206 Ibercaja ES 49 547 58 632
207 Gunma Bank Ltd JP 49 199 84 004
208 First Financial Holding Company Limited TW 49 138 68 736
209 Charles Schwab US 48 992 108 553
210 Chugoku Bank, Ltd. JP 48 483 82 423
211 Guangdong Development Bank CN 47 909 145 986
212 The 77 Bank JP 47 436 99 035
213 AgriBank, FCB US 47 007 73 110
214 Zions Bancorporation US 46 970 53 149
215 Banco Português de Investimento PT 46 935 55 675
216 Sal. Oppenheim jr. & Cie S.C.A. DE 46 647 0
217 Shin Kong Financial Holding Co.,Ltd TW 45 804 70 561
218 Commerce Bancorp, Inc. US 45 316 0
219 Credit Immobilier de France Dveloppement - CIFD FR 45 099 52 950
220 Hamburger Sparkasse - HASPA DE 44 818 49 997
221 CIMB Group Holdings Berhad MY 44 170 94 995
222 Investec Group GB 43 646 70 386
223 NIBC Holding NV NL 43 070 36 624
224 Akbank T.A.S. TR 42 551 73 947
225 Munchener Hypothekenbank eG DE 42 141 48 407
226 Bangkok Bank Public Company Limited TH 41 725 66 791
227 Portman Building Society GB 41 685 0
228 Chang Hwa Commercial Bank Ltd. TW 41 609 52 489
229 Public Bank Berhad MY 41 591 78 923
230 National Commercial Bank SA 41 517 80 315
231 Cobank, ACB US 41 379 63 290
232 Hypo Alpe-Adria-Group AT 40 920 45 536
233 Piraeus Bank GR 40 820 63 965
234 Turkiye Garanti Bankasi A.S. TR 40 293 86 403
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Appendix 2 - Variables used
Variable Comment
Ownership
Type of Investor BD - brokers, BK - banks, EM - employees, FC - financial con-
glomerates, FD - foundations, FF - free float, FM - families, GV
- government, IC - non-financial firms, IS - insurance companies,
MP -mutual & pension funds, PB - private banks, PE - private
equity, SF - Sovereign Funds and TR - trusts & nominees.
Ownership Direct ownership rights as a percentage. As a rule, I used only
common stock (a couple of banks do not have common stock, and
so I use the most similar capital instrument).
Bank




Annual profit over year-end total assets. Numbers were collected
from the consolidated annual reports.
Equity Profitabil-
ity
Annual profit over year-end total equity. Numbers were collected
from the consolidated annual reports.
Share of Fee Percentage of fee income on total NIM plus fees. This variable
captures distinctive characteristics of commercial and investment
banks. Numbers were collected from the consolidated annual re-
ports.
Leverage The ratio of total assets over total equity. Numbers were collected
from the consolidated annual reports.
Country Country of incorporation.
Loan to Deposits
gap
Net loans granted to clients as a percentage of total deposits from
clients. Numbers were collected from the consolidated annual
reports.
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Appendix 2 - Variables used (cont.)
Variable Comment
Bank
Price Volatility Variance of weekly returns of the stock, adjusted for splits and
dividends. Adjusted prices were taken from Datastream.
Beta Beta coefficient calculated with weekly bank stock returns against
weekly returns of the MSCI World Index. For each year beta I
only consider the weekly returns of that same year.
Idiosyncratic
Risk
Diversifiable risk of the stock, computed as Price Volatility less
the product of the square of beta by the variance of the weekly
return of the MSCI World Index.
Earnings Volatil-
ity
Standard deviation of profits in the 6 years of data. Numbers to




3-year arithmetic average growth rate in earnings (Net Interest
Margin + Fees) for pre-shock years (2006-2008). Numbers to




See Boyd & Graham (1986). It is a score that represents the num-
ber of standard deviations of profits over total assets needed to
wipe out equity over total assets (assumes a normal distribution
of returns). A high score means a safer bank. See Appendix 4 for
an explanation of the variable and the decomposition on Z1 and
Z2 scores.
Country
Creditor Rights Creditor Rights Index, collected from Djankov & Shleifer (2007).
This variable measures the legal rights of the creditors against
defaulting debtors in each country.
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WGI Index Worldwide Governance Indicator for each country prepared by
Kaufmann et al. (2010). The variable incorporates different is-
sues like accountability, violence, corruption, rule of law, quality
of regulation and government effectiveness.
GDP per capita Values in current USD. The source is the World Bank.
41


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 4 - Z-Score variable
In our paper I use the Z-score as a measure of bank fragility, or probability of default.
I follow the original methodology proposed by Boyd & Graham (1986). Considering a
random variable Profit that can wipe out Equity in a single year, the probability of that
event is:
P (⇧ <  E) (4)
Dividing both sides by the level of assets (there is also a variation dividing both sides






) = P (⇡ < k) =
Z Z
 1
N(0, 1) dZ (5)
Assuming that the random variable “return on assets” ⇡ follows a normal distribution,
the Z-score is computed as:
Z =  k   ⇡̄
 ⇡
(6)
with the usual notation for the average and the standard deviation of return on assets.
Bear in mind that k is a negative value in a solvent bank. The higher the Z-score, the
safer the bank.
However, it is important to distinguish two components of the Z-score: the intrinsic
risk of the assets (call it Z1) and the level of coverage of that risk (call it Z2). The vari-
able Z1 is a constant during all the period of analysis, whereas Z2 will change every




;Z2 =   k
 ⇡
;Z = Z1 + Z2 (7)
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In some papers, it is used the concept of ZP-score, which is a weighted average of
Z-scores for a given population of banks (for instance, banks of a country, or banks
owned by the State). The weights used are the level of assets of each bank. If the ZP-
score is higher than the simple average Z-scores, it means that large banks are safer
than smaller banks.
45
Appendix 5 - Proof of the DiD estimator
It is straightforward to prove that the coefficient   is the DiD estimator. Ignoring the
impact of control variables, and considering that
E[✏i,t] = 0 (8)
I can say that:
E[OwnerTypei,t|t 6 2008] = ↵ +   ⇥ 0 +   ⇥Di,t +   ⇥ 0 (9)
Also, for t > 2009:
E[OwnerTypei,t|t > 2009] = ↵ +   ⇥ 1 +   ⇥Di,t +   ⇥Di,t (10)
For the treated case, or Di,t = 1, the difference is:
E[OwnerTypei,t|Di,t = 1, t > 2009]  E[OwnerTypei,t|Di,t = 1, t 6 2008] =
= ↵ +   +   +     ↵    =   +   (11)
And for the non-treated case, the difference is:
E[OwnerTypei,t|Di,t = 0, t > 2009]  E[OwnerTypei,t|Di,t = 0, t 6 2008] =
= ↵ +   +   ⇥ 0 +   ⇥ 0  ↵    ⇥ 0 =   (12)
To conclude the proof, the Difference-in-Differences subject of interest is:
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(E[OwnerTypei,t|Di,t = 1, t > 2009]  E[OwnerTypei,t|Di,t = 1, t 6 2008]) 
 (E[OwnerTypei,t|Di,t = 0, t > 2009]  E[OwnerTypei,t|Di,t = 0, t 6 2008]) =
=   (13)
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How banks adjust to a new target capital ratio
Gonçalo Leónidas Rocha





Based on the 184 largest banking groups in the world, I use the five year period after
the global financial crisis (2008-2013) to observe how banks comply with the emerging
regulation of Basel III.
Banks target higher ratios than required, pointing to the conclusion that regulation
may not be binding of the optimal capital structure. The explanation can be found on
the value of flexibility or some market friction. More interesting, banks increase equity
even when they can avoid it.
Most of the adjustment to higher ratios is done through retained earnings. Despite
some interaction with the asset side, only groups of banks with lower initial ratios or
reduced profitability, namely European banks, use that interdependence to meet ratios.
Size (or even higher requirements of the SIFI group) does not explain bank behavior
towards higher capital ratios.
It is also evident the correlation between assets and liabilities to meet a given capital
target. Regulation allows banks to play with the relationship, since the requirement
is a ratio. It is fair to say that regulation is not imposing a low risk strategy, as the
requirements can be achieved with various combinations of capital and risk profiles.
JEL Classification: G280
Keywords: Bank, Regulation, Capital Adequacy, Basel III
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1 Introduction
Since the famous seminal paper from Profs. Franco Modgliani and Merton Miller,
finance theory defends that an optimal capital structure for a firm only exist in the
presence of market frictions26, namely the impact of corporate taxes, personal taxes,
financial distress and so on. This was to be known as the trade off theory of capital
structure. In the banking industry, the irrelevance proposition would render Basel reg-
ulation also irrelevant, as no bank would try to extract value from increased leverage.
The competing theory, known as the pecking order theory, rests on sticky dividend
policy, a preference for internal generated funds and a tendency to issue equity only as
a last resort27. Can this pecking order theory be present in practice when banks adjust
to new Basel capital levels?
Another important part of the capital structure theory is the interaction between as-
sets and liabilities. Is the capital structure policy decided after the investment policy
has been settled?
From the early days of the irrelevant proposition, theory has evolved to accept that
there is some interaction between assets and liabilities. In banks, this is certainly the
case, as regulation calls for a minimum ratio between capital and assets. The amount
of credit and market risk is adjusted by each bank to the target capital ratio.
Due to regulatory pressure, capital is the theme (or, in banking parlance, TLAC -
Total Loss Absorbing Capacity) where equity and only some forms of liabilities are
included. Senior bonds, money market funding and customer deposits28 are removed
26The famous irrelevance proposition from Modigliani & Miller (1958).
27On those theories, see for instance Myers (1984).
28It is defensible that customer deposits are not proper financing decisions, like suppliers funding is
absent from most of the discussions around capital structure of non-financial firms.
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from this discussion of banking capital structure.
Basel III, in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008, asks banks to run at a
much higher level of capital, directing to better quality capital (closer to equity than
subordinated loans). As such, the regulation gives us a good experimental field on the
capital structure theories applied to banks.
For a good discussion of the evolution of Basel Accords and possible future paths
to strengthen banks, see Rochet chapter ”The Future of Banking Regulation” on De-
watripont et al. (2010).
In this paper, I study the adjustment of banks to the Basel III increased capital re-
quirements. Banks can meet the regulation by changing the asset side (on quantity
and/or quality) or by relying on the funding side. More important, I study the charac-
teristics of the bank that leads it to choose among several ways to meet the requirement.
The different contribution of this paper is the use of a larger database (twice the size
of the one used by the Bank of International Settlements29) and the more detailed split
of the contribution in capital and assets towards a target capital ratio. In the asset size,
I distinguish volume from quality effects. In the capital side, I use a broader set of
capital instruments and adjustments. Finally, I perform statistical tests of significance
to check if differences in means are robust. I also perform a multiple linear regression
to check results with a different methodology.
I split the adjustment in Capital effect (the numerator) and RWA effect (the denom-
inator). In capital effect, I split further on equity issue, earnings, dividends and some
other capital instruments to address the contribution of each item to the full capital
29See Cohen & Scatigna (2014)
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effect. For the RWA effect, I split among risk classes (credit, market and operational)
and between quality and volume effect inside each class (we do not have this disentan-
gled in operational risk).
Not all levers are alike: less total assets are more credible from the outside than re-
duced risk weights: banks seem to have been very optimistic in the past in evaluating
their own risks.
In the preliminary assessment that EBA (2013) reported on the differences between
RWA across banks, the conclusion is that 50% of the difference (computed as the gap
between the 5% and the 95% percentiles of the global charge - or RWA plus Expected
Loss over exposure at default) is explained by type-A factors (mainly the profile of
the loan book and the use of standard or IRB approaches) and the remainder to type-B
factors (the use of advanced IRB and some other interpretation of the parameters). The
database used refers to the largest banking groups in the world, where IRB approaches
(standard or advanced) are much more probable30. As such, a note of cautions must be
made on the usage of internal models. The quality assessment is bank/supervisor spe-
cific and risk weights may not mimics the true embedded risk as a result of ”window
dressing”.
This paper shows evidence on several grounds.
Banks target higher ratios than required, pointing to the conclusion that regulation may
not be binding of the optimal capital structure (or the needed capital is not observed).
We also conclude that banks increase equity even when they can avoid it; this is partic-
ularly evident in the group of banks that starts the analysis period with higher capital
30A significant group of banks uses the basic indicator approach to operational risk. However, this
risk has a very limited impact on explaining changes in capital ratios.
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ratios.
By will or capacity, State owned banks use much less equity increase to meet tar-
gets.
Most of the adjustment to higher ratios was done through retained earnings. This
conclusion is consistent to the finding of other authors.
European banks have much lower profitability during the period, and so they have
to rely on asset side adjustments, mainly containing credit volume and significantly
increasing credit quality.
Emerging country banks suffered a lot less from the financial crisis and are able to
increase the asset side during the period of analysis. As such, they have to compensate
with much more capital build-up than their developed country counterparts.
Size (or even higher requirements of the SIFI group) does not explain bank behav-
ior towards higher capital ratios.
Finally, leverage seems to be weakly correlated with regulatory capital ratios.
These conclusions have important regulatory implications. Size discrimination of the
regulation seems to produce meager (if any) effects. Banks target much higher capital
ratios than required by regulation. However, there might be a link between higher re-
quirements from Basel III and the capital increase made by the banks. The explanation
can be found on the value of flexibility (banks prefer to run above minimum to be able
to exploit good asset growing opportunities or to avoid immediate call of funds in the
case of losses) or some market friction (like discontinuities in credit rating and conse-
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quent funding costs or the access to lower quality / higher margin assets that require
higher slack in the capital ratio). Furthermore, we do not observe the exact capital
requirement demanded by supervision on SREP (supervisory review and evaluation
process); it is possible that supervisors demand more capital under pillar II and so the
slack is smaller or non-existent.
Regulation allows banks to play with the relationship between assets and liabilities
to meet a given capital target, since the requirement is a ratio. It is fair to say that reg-
ulation is not imposing a low risk strategy, as the requirements can be achieved with
various combinations of capital and asset profiles.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows: part 2 presents a literature re-
view, part 3 describes the database and specially discusses the split made on capital
and risk weighted assets, part 4 presents the results of the tests and part 5 concludes.
2 Review of the Literature
From the early days of the Basel regulation, some research has been made to find if
regulatory minimum levels are binding bank target capital levels. A pioneering re-
search is Shrieves & Dahl (1992) that points to the existence of some other forces that
can explain the limitation of risk levels, like ownership preferences or managers pri-
vate incentives. The same result is found in several other papers like Gropp & Heider
(2009) or Schaeck & Cihák (2012).
Cohen & Scatigna (2014) address the issue of what instrument is responsible for the
adjustment. Using a database of 94 large global banks, the authors found that the bulk
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of the adjustment towards new capital requirements was done with retained earnings
(less generous dividends) and much less with reductions in the risk profile of the as-
sets. This conclusion is in line with the more extensive database used in this paper.
Curiously enough, they found no reduction on lending, despite a slower growth among
European banks. I found the same volume effect (marginally negative, however) but
with very significant reduction in the risk weight of loan assets by European banks.
The authors also analyze the impact of each extra percentage point of existing capital
on the loan portfolio, total assets, total RWA and the trading portfolio. For instance,
they found that banks with higher capital ratios in 2009 tend to grow faster their asset
base in the period 2009-2012 (they were unconstrained). The relationship to loan or
RWA growth is also positive but not significant.
Kok & Schepens (2013) found that banks adjust in an asymmetric fashion to shocks.
When banks are overcapitalized, they prefer to adjust by increasing total assets or in-
creasing the riskiness of assets (without reducing equity by paying extra dividends,
for instance); whereas when under-capitalized they try to adjust via risk weighted as-
sets or equity issues. These findings are consistent with the conclusions of this paper.
The authors also address the reaction to the economic environment. For instance, an
under-capitalized bank might issue equity during ”normal” times but has to rely on
deleveraging during crisis years, when capital markets may not be available.
Memmel & Raupach (2010) report the adjustment of capital ratios among German
banks, using monthly regulatory data. They found the existence of target capital ratios
above regulatory minimum, in line to our findings. However, contrary to our conclu-
sions, the authors claim that asset side adjustments are prevalent to meet capital ratio
targets.
Francis & Osborne (2012) have an interesting and unique database: they use bank
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specific regulation, or the capital adjustments required in the UK for each bank, taking
into account governance, risk management and market environment. This approach
is interesting as an 8% fixed threshold is not a good proxy for an unconstrained bank
(markets and regulators may be imposing higher levels). The study finds that loan
growth is positively associated with high target capital level, but not so with required
capital level. If a well capitalized bank has better chances of increasing the loan book,
this effect does not happen when the bank is still adjusting to the preferred target level.
A bank with a low capital target level will have the incentive to comply to the reg-
ulation with the lower quality capital accepted, like tier II instruments (I don’t back
this conclusion using the global database. It seems that lower capital ratio banks use
more asset side adjustments and not necessarily low quality capital). A regulatory im-
position might lead to this type of behavior; high quality capital should be demanded.
However, banks can play with the level of assets or the risk weights.
Camara et al. (2013) uses a database of 1142 European banks to investigate the im-
pact of capital regulation on risk profile of banks. The regulation shock studied is
Basel I. The authors concluded for the existence of different risk impacts from the
instrument (equity, subordinated or hybrid capital) used by banks to fulfill regulation
requirements. However, they don’t address why banks choose one instrument or some
other.
Tanda (2015) has a very comprehensive overview of past literature, mainly address-
ing the period before Basel III. Her conclusions point to the existence of a significant
link between regulation and bank decisions on capital.
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3 Data and Summary Statistics
The data-set that I use is compiled from annual reports and pillar 3 disclosures from
the largest banks in the world. In this sample, I consider all banks that, in the starting
year of 2008, have at least 40 billion US dollars of assets. In total, we have 215 banks,
from which we can work with 184. The remaining banks have very little information.
Before using the data, I made some treatment to fill the missing information on some
variables. The missing information is the split of risk weighted assets among credit,
market and operational risk.
Whenever I have most of the data for a bank, with one or two missing values, I ex-
trapolate the missing values using mainly two ratios: the market risk value over the
trading book (or the risk weight used to the trading portfolio) and the operating risk
over the RWA. Credit risk is computed as the remainder. The next methodology used
to fill the gaps is a recursive regression: I run a regression on the sample of banks
with full information to have the coefficients for the missing variables. Then I use the
prediction for each missing value and run again the regression to calculate new predic-
tions. I continue to do this until the predictions for the missing values stabilize (my
implementation considered the sample to have stabilized when the square of the dif-
ferences between two consecutive predictions is less than 20% of the previous squared
prediction31). After 39 iterations, the changes are very small. This method fills missing
values for around 20% of the banks.
Using the regressed coefficients, I am neutralizing the effect of those variables. As
such, the entire row of information can be used (much richer than just the RWA split)
that otherwise would have to be dropped. The RWA split accounts for a small part of
31I am summing squares of monetary amounts, which are huge numbers. In the last 10 iterations,
the coefficients of the regression changed very little.
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the capital adjustment effect studied.
Then I split, for each single bank, the change in Total Capital ratio (measured as Reg-
ulatory Capital / Risk Weighted Assets) from 2008 to 2013 into several components.
The method used is a chain of ratios that represent a mathematical identity. Capital
and RWA effects are split into components, and Credit and Market Risks inside RWA





= CapitalE +RWAE (14)












The capital is further split in its components of equity (share capital plus equity pre-
mium), earnings, dividends, other Core Tier 1, other Tier 1, and Tier 2. The denomina-
tor is always RWA at the end of the period. Some effects are computed as differences,
like equity effect that represents the difference between end period equity and begin-
ning period equity. Earnings and dividends effects are computed as the total amount
of each component during the full period, again divided by RWA. To solve the equa-
tion, reserves are adjusted accordingly and summed up inside other Core Tier 1 effects.
32The subscript 0 represents the beginning of the period of analysis, meaning 2008, and the subscript
1 represents the end of the period, or 2013. I will also used a superscript E to represent the effect. When
no superscript is present, the dollar amount is represented.
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The RWA effect is decomposed into Credit (CR), Market (MR) and Operational (OR)







With this decomposition, a cross effect must arise and it is disclosed. However, it rep-
resents always very small amounts and with no significant difference between sample
groups.
In Table 6, I present descriptive statistics of the splitting process done. The first con-
clusion that can taken from the table is the quite robust average capital ratio of the
banks included in the sample. The average is unweighted. However, the big standard
deviation points to very different situations inside the sample.
During the five year period of the study, banks increased capital ratio in 2.62 per-
centage points, achieved by an increase in capital, as the risk weighted assets also
increased, pressuring the ratio down.
The capital effect is the result of significant retained earnings. Equity increase also
plays a relevant role, but less relevant than retained earnings. In terms of quality,
the table shows more equity contribution than lower quality capital. During this pe-
riod, some lower quality capital instruments, issued before the global financial crisis
of 2008, were disqualified by Basel III regulation.
It is fair to say that equity holders bear most of the burden of the adjustment, either
by bringing more capital to their banks, or by sacrificing dividends, in order to boost
retained earnings.
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One interesting aspect is the persistence of dividends together with equity calls. Taking
only the banks with higher dividends effect (the group below the median of a negative
effect of 1,16%), equity effect is almost indistinguishable from the group with lower
dividends effects (2.22% against 2.35%, not statistically significant at a 90% confi-
dence level). The pecking order theory predicts dividend persistence, and it seems to
be the case here.
In terms of risk weighted assets, all components contribute to an increase in the de-
nominator, requiring more capital. In credit and market risks, volume effect is respon-
sible for the added risk, as the quality, measured here as the risk weight, improved.
Another interesting result is the dispersion around the mean, with credit impacts (vol-
ume and quality) showing higher dispersion. As the database covers a period of the
recovery from the financial crisis, also earnings effect presents significant dispersion.
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Table 6
This table reports the way banks adjust to new capital ratios, from 2008 to 2013. Sample consists of the
largest 184 banks in the world, all with total assets in 2008 above USD 40 bn.
Average Std Deviation
Initial Capital Ratio 14,00% 10,57%
RWA effect -1,30% 9,22%
Capital effect 3,92% 7,48%
Final Capital Ratio 16,62% 9,68%
Capital Effects
Equity effect 2,28% 3,60%
Earnings effect 4,44% 7,80%
Dividends effect -1,78% 2,15%
Other Core Tier 1 effect -0,07% 5,80%
Non Core Tier 1 Effect -0,64% 1,95%
Tier 2 effect -0,30% 2,25%
RWA Effects
Credit Risk Effect -1,08% 8,48%
Market Risk effect -0,03% 0,65%
Operational Risk effect -0,33% 1,03%
cross effect 0,13% 0,43%
Credit Risk Effects
Impairment effect 0,10% 0,38%
Quality effect 1,19% 7,48%
Volume effect -2,37% 6,67%
Market Risk Effects
Quality effect 0,05% 0,84%
Volume effect -0,08% 0,64%
Sample Count 184
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4 Methodology and Empirical Tests
The way banks increase capital ratios is not homogeneous. In this section, I test some
banks characteristics that explain different behavior. The methodology used is a split
of the dataset around each characteristic, compute the average and test if the difference
between the averages is significantly different from zero.
The first test, presented on Table 7, splits the sample between State owned and pri-
vately owned banks. The ownership characteristic is taken from the database of a
previous paper33.
State owned banks have a smaller increase in capital ratio, but they started with a
higher number. It is not statistically significant the impact of the credit volume, but it
seems that State owned banks keep granting credit and increasing capital.
It is interesting the reduction of lower quality capital among privately owned banks
(compensated by more equity), that had a lot more usage of this type of instruments
before Basel III regulation.
In Table 8 the sample is evenly split in terms of the size of assets (2013 figures).
The conclusion is that size is not a significant characteristic to lead banks to different
behavior. This result also supports the option not to weight individual figures accord-
ing to a size characteristic, like total assets, as the outcome would not be affected.
The same exercise is performed using a split between SIFI and non-SIFI banks (Table
9). SIFI, meaning Systemic Important Financial Institution, is a classification granted
by the Bank of International Settlements to banks that have significant impact on the
World financial system, due to size, interconnectedness, dispersion of business world-
33see Rocha (2013)
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wide. I use the final list of November 2014 (the only relevant for the obligation to
have more capital). The sample uses prior information, however BIS revealed every
year (since 2011) the likely candidates to be SIFI in 2014, and the list did not change
very much during the period. I assume SIFI anticipated the classification and behaved
accordingly.
SIFI banks have to comply with higher capital ratios, being the difference made by
high quality capital. However, the differences in behavior to non-SIFI banks are not
significant.
Geography plays a lot more relevant role to explain significant differences among
banks. Emerging market banks have almost a negligible increase in capital ratios (see
Table 10); however, they have significant increases in capital requirements (or RWA)
and available capital. Developed market banks reduced capital requirements and in-
creased available capital by a much smaller percentage.
Developed market banks reduced credit and market risk, mainly through volume effect.
These banks had also less profitability and, consequently, less dividend distribution.
Developed market behavior is driven mainly by European banks that reached the crisis
in a worse shape than counterparts, as in Table 11 it is possible to see that US banks
played an insignificant role on the developed market performance. In Table 12 we
see the full impact of European banks, that represent almost half of the sample. In all
tests, only European banks reveal a statistically significant lower initial capital ratio34.
It is evident the strong reduction of credit risk, mainly driven by an increase in quality.
European banks have less profitability to recover capital ratios, and also spend less on
dividends. They were also the banks that reduced strongly Tier 2 capital instruments,
34Exception made obviously to the last test, where banks are split by their initial capital ratio, and so
the significant difference is obtained by construction.
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very popular until the crisis.
When I combine US and European banks to compare against all the others (Table
13), results are similar to the European effect, just a little more pronounced.
In Table 14 I split the sample in two according to the growth rate of total assets. By
construction, the RWA effect of the fast growth banks is significantly lower than slow
growth banks. Interesting is the fact that fast growth banks had much higher profitabil-
ity and significantly less impairment effects on their credit risk.
One of the novelties from Basel III is the leverage ratio (Table 15). I split the sample in
two groups according to the leverage ratio of 2008. The first striking result is that the
total capital ratio is more or less similar in both sets. This result has significant regula-
tory implications, as it represents a disturbing conclusion: it is possible to achieve the
same regulatory target even with completely different leverage ratios35. High leverage
banks have a leverage ratio of 31, whereas low leverage stay at 12.
With Basel III rules, the leverage ratio will represent a constraint36. As such, the table
reveals an adjustment more evident in the amount of the securities portfolio37, or the
volume of market risk.
Another interesting characteristic is the relationship between loans and deposits (see
Table 16). Banks with more deposits than loans perform better during this period
(probably due to significant liquidity constraints in the market), using retained earn-
35Blum (2008) address the same concern that ”dishonest” banks can report safer risk weighted ratios
relatively unnoticed by the supervisor.
36In the period of the analysis, the leverage constraint is not yet mandatory. However, banks know
that something between 25 and 33 will be the admissible maximum.
37The volume effect of market risk is not the dollar value of the securities portfolio, as also off-
balance sheet items account for market risk. However, it is used as a proxy to disentangle volume and
quality effects.
64
ings to increase the total capital ratio. However, these ”higher deposits” banks also
increased the volume of credit risk (more loans), in sharp contrast to the meager de-
crease from their ”higher loans” counterparts.
In Table 17, I explore the impact of Return on Equity, or ROE. The large dispersion of
reduced ROE is caused by the inclusion of loss making and negative equity banks. The
difference between initial capital ratios is not being statistically significant, as ROE
mainly arises in subsequent years38. For the final capital ratio, the test supports the
idea that higher ROE is associated with lower capital ratio, in line with a traditional
positive relationship between risk and return.
Furthermore, higher ROE banks earned significantly more (by construction) during
the analysis period, paying more in dividends (with more retained earnings), and in-
creasing significantly more the loan portfolio.
Another test is performed splitting the sample banks according to the loan growth ratio
seen during the period of analysis (Table 18). By construction, higher loan growth
banks had a much lower capital contribution via credit volume effect. The banks that
increase credit more also increase market risk via a volume effect. These banks have
higher capital ratio to begin with, and can also extract higher profits from the activity
during the period.
My final test splits the banks according to the initial capital ratio (Table 19). The
median capital ratio, used to split the sample, is 12,3%. Given also the regulatory min-
imum, it is not surprising the very low dispersion of the lower capital ratio group.
Banks with higher initial capital ratio are able to extract more profitability from the
38The split was performed using the average ROE (unweighted) during the period.
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activity39, also increasing the volume of the loan portfolio. In the end, even after
a robust safety margin above minimum capital requirements, this group increase the
capital ratio even further during the period. However, the lower initial capital ratio
group catches up during the period, mainly due to a positive RWA effect (or less bal-
ance sheet expansion).
Quite surprising is the contribution of the equity effect on Higher Capital Ratio Banks,
undistinguished from the equity effect of their Lower Capital Ratio counterparts. This
means that banks that could avoid issuing new equity decided to do it anyhow. The
pecking order theory is contradicted by evidence in this real life experiment. The ex-
planation can be found in the credit ratings of the bank that show discontinuities in
terms of pricing and quantity. For instance, Central Bank discount window access
might be capped at an investment grade level. SREP, or supervisory review and eval-
uation process, can explain this behavior, as we cannot observe the true capital ratio
required by local supervisor to each bank, as part of pillar two reviews.
The table also shows that the dividend impact is very similar, with symmetric sign,
to the equity effect: Higher Capital Ratio banks could have foregone equity issues
simply by sacrificing dividends. This is consistent with the pecking order theory pre-
diction that firms stick to a stable dividend policy, showing reluctance to change it.
This sticky dividend policy is even more evident in the Lower Capital Ratio group that
has more capital to build and, even so, distributes most of the earnings.
As a robustness check on the conclusions, a multiple linear regression is performed
on major dependent variables, namely the equity and dividend effects on the capital
numerator, and the credit volume and quality effects on the RWA denominator. Re-
sults are presented on Table 20.
39This profitability is measured in terms of RWA, a proxy to a Return on Assets ratio. This paper
finds lower ROE profitability of higher initial capital ratio banks
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As expected, a higher effect on other capital instrument reduces the need for more
equity. Bear in mind that dividends have always a negative sign, as they contribute
negatively for the capital formation. As such, a negative coefficient means that more
dividends (a larger negative number in the dividend effect) call for more equity. Also,
more credit risk (a negative effect) calls for more equity40.
More curious is the coefficient of the initial capital ratio. There is some mild evidence
that supports more equity effect from the banks that are already more capitalized.
Emerging country banks and European banks have significant positive coefficients on
the dummy variables. For different reasons, both groups call for more capital: emerg-
ing country banks to support asset expansion and European banks to recover from
weaker capital structures. It is also observable that State owned bank rely less on eq-
uity to increase capital ratios.
Not less interesting is the result of the dividend effect regression. As expected, all
capital instruments have negative coefficients, confirming that a generous dividend
policy calls for some form of recapitalization. What is more relevant is that the initial
capital ratio or most of the control variables do not present meaningful coefficients.
For instance, higher asset growth is not linked to reduced dividends. SIFI banks are
associated with less dividends.
The credit volume effect is associated with the expected coefficient sign on capital
instruments: more credit calls for more capital and less dividends. Volume and qual-
ity run in opposite directions: when volume grows, the risk weight tends to reduce to
contain the expansion of the credit risk. Credit volume is also associated with more
40The operational risk effect is of less relevancy here. RWA on average is split between credit risk
with 88% of the total, market risk with 5% and operational risk with the remaining 7%.
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market risk41: when the bank is able to expand credit, it is expanding also the securities
portfolio. Consistent with previous tests, Emerging country banks are expanding credit
volume whereas European banks are shrinking the loan book. The same conclusions
can be taken from the final regression on credit quality effect.
5 Conclusions
Based of the 184 largest banking groups in the world, I use the five year period after
the global financial crisis (2008-2013) to observe how banks comply with the emerg-
ing regulation of Basel III.
Banks target higher ratios than required, pointing to the conclusion that regulation
may not be binding of the optimal capital structure. More interesting, banks increase
equity even when they can avoid doing it, which seems to contradict the pecking order
theory. This is particularly evident in the group of banks that started the analysis period
with higher capital ratios.
Most of the adjustment to higher ratios is done through retained earnings. Despite
some interaction with the asset side, only groups of banks with lower initial ratios or
reduced profitability, namely European banks, use that interdependence to meet ratios
(banks with slack in terms of capital or profitability increased assets further).
Size (or even higher requirements of the SIFI group) does not explain bank behavior
towards higher capital ratios. Leverage seems to be weakly correlated with regulatory
41Bank reporting is sometimes incomplete, with no distinction between trading and banking book.
Furthermore, some risks like currency, commodities and settlement on the banking book are considered
for market risk. For consistency, I use both trading and banking book for market risk volume effect, and
the banking book is removed from credit risk volume effect.
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capital ratios.
These conclusions have important regulatory implications. Size discrimination of the
regulation seems to produce meager (if any) effects. Banks target much higher capital
ratios than required by regulation. However, there might be a link between higher re-
quirements from Basel III and the capital increase made by the banks. The explanation
can be found on the value of flexibility (banks prefer to run above minimum to be able
to exploit good asset growing opportunities or to avoid immediate call of funds in the
case of losses) or some market friction (like discontinuities in credit rating and conse-
quent funding costs or the access to lower quality / higher margin assets that require
higher slack in the capital ratio).
It is also evident the correlation between assets and liabilities to meet a given capi-
tal target. Regulation allows banks to play with the relationship, since the requirement
is a ratio. It is fair to say that regulation is not imposing a low risk strategy, as the




This table reports the way banks adjusted to new capital ratios, from 2008 to 2013. Sample consists
of the largest 184 banks in the world, all with total assets in 2008 above USD 40 bn. The sample is
split between State owned and privately owned banks. A bank is considered State owned if the main
shareholder is the Government of the country where the bank is incorporated.
T-stat and last column refer to a two-sided test of difference in means, being H0 the hypothesis that the
population means are equal, against the alternative H1 that the difference between population means is
different from zero. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
State Owned Privately Owned
Variable mean stdev mean stdev t-stat
Initial Capital Ratio 14,40% 12,32% 13,87% 10,01% 0,195
RWA effect -3,44% 10,58% -0,63% 8,69% -1,205
Capital effect 5,19% 5,87% 3,53% 7,89% 1,071
Final Capital Ratio 16,16% 7,62% 16,77% 10,26% -0,305
Equity effect 1,03% 2,28% 2,68% 3,84% -2,462 **
Earnings effect 4,92% 7,28% 4,29% 7,98% 0,357
Dividends effect -1,51% 1,41% -1,87% 2,33% 0,869
Other Core Tier 1 effect 0,44% 4,96% -0,23% 6,05% 0,535
Non Core Tier 1 Effect -0,03% 0,95% -0,83% 2,14% 2,446 **
Tier 2 effect 0,35% 1,92% -0,50% 2,32% 1,756 *
Credit Risk Effect -3,26% 10,20% -0,39% 7,78% -1,307
Market Risk effect -0,11% 0,73% 0,00% 0,63% -0,627
Operational Risk effect -0,30% 0,82% -0,34% 1,09% 0,142
cross effect 0,23% 0,46% 0,10% 0,42% 1,299
Impairment effect 0,11% 0,38% 0,10% 0,38% 0,102
CR Quality effect 1,02% 12,69% 1,25% 4,87% -0,098
CR Volume effect -4,39% 9,74% -1,73% 5,25% -1,386
MR Quality effect -0,04% 0,66% 0,08% 0,88% -0,688
MR Volume effect -0,06% 0,63% -0,08% 0,65% 0,118
Sample Count 44 140
70
Table 8
This table reports the way banks adjusted to new capital ratios, from 2008 to 2013. Sample consists of
the largest 184 banks in the world, all with total assets in 2008 above USD 40 bn. The sample is split
evenly using 2013 total assets in USD terms (larger banks have more than USD 203,5 bn. in assets).
T-stat and last column refer to a two-sided test of difference in means, being H0 the hypothesis that the
population means are equal, against the alternative H1 that the difference between population means is
different from zero. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Larger Smaller
Variable mean stdev mean stdev t-stat
Initial Capital Ratio 15,28% 14,62% 12,72% 2,80% 1,412
RWA effect -2,22% 10,87% -0,38% 7,16% -0,977
Capital effect 4,92% 8,74% 2,93% 5,82% 1,312
Final Capital Ratio 17,98% 13,01% 15,26% 3,92% 1,540
Equity effect 2,16% 2,68% 2,40% 4,33% -0,330
Earnings effect 5,61% 5,68% 3,26% 9,35% 1,498
Dividends effect -1,86% 1,87% -1,70% 2,40% -0,362
Other Core Tier 1 effect -0,11% 6,30% -0,03% 5,30% -0,066
Non Core Tier 1 Effect -0,61% 2,03% -0,67% 1,88% 0,140
Tier 2 effect -0,27% 2,46% -0,34% 2,04% 0,151
Credit Risk Effect -1,97% 10,03% -0,19% 6,51% -1,031
Market Risk effect -0,02% 0,75% -0,04% 0,54% 0,148
Operational Risk effect -0,34% 1,28% -0,32% 0,69% -0,073
cross effect 0,10% 0,48% 0,16% 0,37% -0,732
Impairment effect 0,05% 0,26% 0,14% 0,46% -1,202
CR Quality effect 0,98% 8,34% 1,40% 6,54% -0,269
CR Volume effect -3,00% 5,33% -1,73% 7,77% -0,930
MR Quality effect 0,03% 1,00% 0,07% 0,63% -0,267
MR Volume effect -0,04% 0,79% -0,11% 0,46% 0,504
Sample Count 92 92
71
Table 9
This table reports the way banks adjusted to new capital ratios, from 2008 to 2013. Sample consists of
the largest 184 banks in the world, all with total assets in 2008 above USD 40 bn. The sample is split
between SIFI and non-SIFI banks, according to the BIS disclosure in November 2014.
T-stat and last column refer to a two-sided test of difference in means, being H0 the hypothesis that the
population means are equal, against the alternative H1 that the difference between population means is
different from zero. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
SIFI Non-SIFI
Variable mean stdev mean stdev t-stat
Initial Capital Ratio 14,23% 4,04% 13,96% 11,33% 0,157
RWA effect -0,67% 4,16% -1,41% 9,84% 0,468
Capital effect 3,19% 3,85% 4,05% 7,94% -0,629
Final Capital Ratio 16,75% 3,29% 16,60% 10,40% 0,097
Equity effect 2,73% 2,95% 2,21% 3,70% 0,608
Earnings effect 5,49% 3,53% 4,26% 8,31% 0,922
Dividends effect -1,55% 1,15% -1,82% 2,28% 0,690
Other Core Tier 1 effect -0,87% 3,18% 0,06% 6,14% -0,844
Non Core Tier 1 Effect -1,68% 2,95% -0,46% 1,67% -1,735 *
Tier 2 effect -0,95% 1,88% -0,19% 2,30% -1,390
Credit Risk Effect -0,39% 3,92% -1,20% 9,04% 0,547
Market Risk effect -0,19% 0,63% 0,00% 0,66% -1,088
Operational Risk effect -0,11% 0,97% -0,37% 1,04% 0,949
cross effect 0,02% 0,28% 0,15% 0,45% -1,473
Impairment effect -0,01% 0,14% 0,12% 0,40% -2,139 **
CR Quality effect 1,49% 2,40% 1,14% 8,04% 0,314
CR Volume effect -1,87% 4,03% -2,46% 7,03% 0,441
MR Quality effect -0,36% 0,52% 0,12% 0,86% -2,828 ***
MR Volume effect 0,17% 0,66% -0,12% 0,63% 1,628
Sample Count 27 157
72
Table 10
This table reports the way banks adjusted to new capital ratios, from 2008 to 2013. Sample consists of
the largest 184 banks in the world, all with total assets in 2008 above USD 40 bn. The sample is split
between banks incorporated in Emerging Markets (IMF country classification) and banks incorporated
in Developed markets.
T-stat and last column refer to a two-sided test of difference in means, being H0 the hypothesis that the
population means are equal, against the alternative H1 that the difference between population means is
different from zero. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Emerging Developed
Variable mean stdev mean stdev t-stat
Initial Capital Ratio 15,35% 17,03% 13,56% 7,42% 0,563
RWA effect -8,95% 11,06% 1,18% 6,97% -4,523 ***
Capital effect 9,58% 10,72% 2,09% 4,87% 3,722 ***
Final Capital Ratio 15,97% 17,22% 16,83% 5,43% -0,285
Equity effect 3,61% 5,18% 1,85% 2,80% 1,745 *
Earnings effect 7,24% 11,07% 3,53% 6,18% 1,704 *
Dividends effect -2,54% 2,12% -1,54% 2,11% -2,012 **
Other Core Tier 1 effect 0,23% 8,48% -0,17% 4,66% 0,240
Non Core Tier 1 Effect -0,02% 0,81% -0,84% 2,16% 2,703 ***
Tier 2 effect 1,05% 1,51% -0,74% 2,28% 4,269 ***
Credit Risk Effect -8,12% 9,88% 1,20% 6,54% -4,598 ***
Market Risk effect -0,28% 0,62% 0,06% 0,64% -2,307 **
Operational Risk effect -0,84% 1,57% -0,16% 0,71% -2,324 **
cross effect 0,30% 0,44% 0,08% 0,41% 2,179 **
Impairment effect 0,09% 0,36% 0,10% 0,38% -0,095
CR Quality effect -1,41% 6,79% 2,04% 7,52% -2,089 **
CR Volume effect -6,80% 4,76% -0,93% 6,58% -4,630 ***
MR Quality effect 0,03% 0,71% 0,05% 0,87% -0,151
MR Volume effect -0,31% 0,53% 0,00% 0,66% -2,312 **
Sample Count 45 139
73
Table 11
This table reports the way banks adjusted to new capital ratios, from 2008 to 2013. Sample consists of
the largest 184 banks in the world, all with total assets in 2008 above USD 40 bn. The sample is split
between banks incorporated in the US and banks incorporated in any other country.
T-stat and last column refer to a two-sided test of difference in means, being H0 the hypothesis that the
population means are equal, against the alternative H1 that the difference between population means is
different from zero. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
US Non-US
Variable mean stdev mean stdev t-stat
Initial Capital Ratio 15,97% 3,90% 13,72% 11,19% 1,331
RWA effect -1,32% 5,42% -1,30% 9,66% -0,012
Capital effect 1,69% 5,79% 4,24% 7,65% -1,409
Final Capital Ratio 16,35% 3,73% 16,66% 10,26% -0,200
Equity effect 3,18% 3,59% 2,16% 3,59% 0,994
Earnings effect 5,56% 3,93% 4,28% 8,20% 0,876
Dividends effect -1,53% 1,62% -1,82% 2,22% 0,564
Other Core Tier 1 effect -1,12% 3,80% 0,08% 6,03% -0,943
Non Core Tier 1 Effect -3,32% 3,11% -0,26% 1,36% -4,049 ***
Tier 2 effect -1,08% 1,90% -0,19% 2,28% -1,548
Credit Risk Effect -1,15% 4,79% -1,07% 8,89% -0,047
Market Risk effect -0,26% 0,68% 0,01% 0,65% -1,402
Operational Risk effect -0,02% 1,08% -0,37% 1,01% 1,166
cross effect 0,10% 0,46% 0,13% 0,43% -0,232
Impairment effect -0,07% 0,12% 0,12% 0,39% -3,344 ***
CR Quality effect 0,12% 3,15% 1,35% 7,90% -0,955
CR Volume effect -1,20% 5,51% -2,54% 6,82% 0,790
MR Quality effect -0,06% 0,40% 0,06% 0,88% -0,824
MR Volume effect -0,20% 0,71% -0,06% 0,63% -0,721
Sample Count 23 161
74
Table 12
This table reports way banks adjusted to new capital ratios, from 2008 to 2013. Sample consists of
the largest 184 banks in the world, all with total assets in 2008 above USD 40 bn. The sample is split
between banks incorporated in Europe and banks incorporated in any other continent.
T-stat and last column refer to a two-sided test of difference in means, being H0 the hypothesis that the
population means are equal, against the alternative H1 that the difference between population means is
different from zero. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
European Non-European
Variable mean stdev mean stdev t-stat
Initial Capital Ratio 12,24% 2,66% 15,35% 13,74% -1,893 *
RWA effect 3,77% 5,67% -5,20% 9,55% 5,715 ***
Capital effect 1,10% 4,80% 6,10% 8,41% -3,675 ***
Final Capital Ratio 17,11% 4,11% 16,25% 12,38% 0,512
Equity effect 2,39% 4,44% 2,21% 2,80% 0,233
Earnings effect 0,28% 8,66% 7,64% 5,18% -4,983 ***
Dividends effect -1,00% 1,32% -2,39% 2,45% 3,569 ***
Other Core Tier 1 effect 1,17% 6,00% -1,03% 5,49% 1,825 *
Non Core Tier 1 Effect -0,53% 1,59% -0,72% 2,19% 0,497
Tier 2 effect -1,21% 2,11% 0,40% 2,11% -3,637 ***
Credit Risk Effect 3,55% 5,08% -4,64% 8,86% 5,698 ***
Market Risk effect 0,22% 0,58% -0,22% 0,65% 3,402 ***
Operational Risk effect -0,12% 0,58% -0,49% 1,25% 1,953 *
cross effect 0,12% 0,32% 0,14% 0,50% -0,171
Impairment effect 0,27% 0,49% -0,03% 0,15% 4,363 ***
CR Quality effect 3,30% 6,75% -0,42% 7,63% 2,475 **
CR Volume effect -0,02% 7,60% -4,18% 5,21% 3,055 ***
MR Quality effect 0,06% 0,62% 0,04% 0,97% 0,136
MR Volume effect 0,16% 0,48% -0,26% 0,70% 3,390 ***
Sample Count 80 104
75
Table 13
This table reports the way banks adjusted to new capital ratios, from 2008 to 2013. Sample consists of
the largest 184 banks in the world, all with total assets in 2008 above USD 40 bn. The sample is split
between banks incorporated in the US or Europe and banks incorporated in any other country.
T-stat and last column refer to a two-sided test of difference in means, being H0 the hypothesis that the
population means are equal, against the alternative H1 that the difference between population means is
different from zero. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Non US/European US or European
Variable mean stdev mean stdev t-stat
Initial Capital Ratio 15,18% 15,46% 13,07% 3,35% 1,028
RWA effect -6,30% 10,19% 2,63% 5,98% -5,194 ***
Capital effect 7,35% 8,64% 1,23% 5,01% 4,209 ***
Final Capital Ratio 16,22% 13,91% 16,94% 4,03% -0,368
Equity effect 1,93% 2,49% 2,56% 4,26% -0,911
Earnings effect 8,22% 5,35% 1,46% 8,14% 4,841 ***
Dividends effect -2,63% 2,60% -1,12% 1,40% -3,537 ***
Other Core Tier 1 effect -1,01% 5,90% 0,66% 5,65% -1,377
Non Core Tier 1 Effect 0,01% 1,02% -1,15% 2,33% 3,402 ***
Tier 2 effect 0,82% 1,99% -1,18% 2,06% 4,728 ***
Credit Risk Effect -5,63% 9,51% 2,50% 5,36% -5,129 ***
Market Risk effect -0,20% 0,65% 0,11% 0,63% -2,355 **
Operational Risk effect -0,62% 1,27% -0,10% 0,72% -2,474 **
cross effect 0,15% 0,51% 0,12% 0,35% 0,304
Impairment effect -0,02% 0,16% 0,20% 0,46% -3,505 ***
CR Quality effect -0,58% 8,50% 2,59% 6,26% -2,030 **
CR Volume effect -5,02% 4,83% -0,28% 7,18% -3,808 ***
MR Quality effect 0,07% 1,08% 0,03% 0,58% 0,191
MR Volume effect -0,27% 0,70% 0,08% 0,56% -2,641 ***
Sample Count 81 103
76
Table 14
This table reports the way banks adjusted to new capital ratios, from 2008 to 2013. Sample consists of
the largest 184 banks in the world, all with total assets in 2008 above USD 40 bn. The sample is split
evenly using the rate of total assets growth between 2008 and 2013. Assets were computed in USD
terms. Fast growth banks grew more than 16.4% during the period, or 3.1% compounded per year.
T-stat and last column refer to a two-sided test of difference in means, being H0 the hypothesis that the
population means are equal, against the alternative H1 that the difference between population means is
different from zero. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Fast Growth Slow Growth
Variable mean stdev mean stdev t-stat
Initial Capital Ratio 14,40% 12,12% 13,60% 8,81% 0,369
RWA effect -5,76% 8,79% 3,16% 7,33% -5,307 ***
Capital effect 7,24% 8,42% 0,61% 4,38% 4,966 ***
Final Capital Ratio 15,88% 12,22% 17,36% 6,17% -0,772
Equity effect 2,73% 3,20% 1,84% 3,92% 1,207
Earnings effect 7,65% 5,91% 1,23% 8,16% 4,380 ***
Dividends effect -2,44% 2,47% -1,13% 1,52% -3,155 ***
Other Core Tier 1 effect -1,11% 5,80% 0,96% 5,65% -1,733 *
Non Core Tier 1 Effect -0,17% 1,32% -1,11% 2,34% 2,445 **
Tier 2 effect 0,58% 1,94% -1,18% 2,21% 4,066 ***
Credit Risk Effect -5,06% 7,92% 2,90% 7,06% -5,095 ***
Market Risk effect -0,22% 0,74% 0,17% 0,48% -3,074 ***
Operational Risk effect -0,65% 1,26% -0,01% 0,58% -3,349 ***
cross effect 0,17% 0,52% 0,09% 0,31% 0,868
Impairment effect 0,02% 0,24% 0,18% 0,46% -2,086 **
CR Quality effect 0,55% 5,47% 1,83% 9,04% -0,845
CR Volume effect -5,63% 4,16% 0,89% 7,12% -5,550 ***
MR Quality effect 0,12% 1,07% -0,03% 0,50% 0,928
MR Volume effect -0,35% 0,70% 0,20% 0,44% -4,576 ***
Sample Count 92 92
77
Table 15
This table reports the way banks adjusted to new capital ratios, from 2008 to 2013. Sample consists of
the largest 184 banks in the world, all with total assets in 2008 above USD 40 bn. The sample is split
evenly using the leverage ratio (total assets over total equity) in 2008. Higher leverage banks had a ratio
above 16.93.
T-stat and last column refer to a two-sided test of difference in means, being H0 the hypothesis that the
population means are equal, against the alternative H1 that the difference between population means is
different from zero. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Higher Leverage Lower Leverage
Variable mean stdev mean stdev t-stat
Initial Capital Ratio 14,02% 14,66% 13,98% 3,16% 0,021
RWA effect 0,34% 11,13% -2,94% 6,47% 1,791 *
Capital effect 3,26% 9,05% 4,59% 5,45% -0,881
Final Capital Ratio 17,62% 13,22% 15,63% 3,43% 1,148
Equity effect 2,03% 2,96% 2,54% 4,14% -0,695
Earnings effect 3,09% 6,89% 5,78% 8,44% -1,684 *
Dividends effect -1,44% 1,83% -2,13% 2,38% 1,576
Other Core Tier 1 effect 0,49% 6,19% -0,64% 5,36% 0,934
Non Core Tier 1 Effect -0,25% 1,55% -1,03% 2,22% 1,997 **
Tier 2 effect -0,67% 2,24% 0,06% 2,22% -1,569
Credit Risk Effect 0,35% 10,31% -2,50% 5,84% 1,694 *
Market Risk effect 0,14% 0,51% -0,20% 0,74% 2,628 ***
Operational Risk effect -0,29% 1,19% -0,37% 0,83% 0,366
cross effect 0,14% 0,34% 0,12% 0,50% 0,141
Impairment effect 0,17% 0,45% 0,03% 0,27% 1,770 *
CR Quality effect 1,57% 10,21% 0,81% 2,81% 0,558
CR Volume effect -1,39% 7,55% -3,35% 5,53% 1,440
MR Quality effect 0,01% 0,48% 0,09% 1,08% -0,457
MR Volume effect 0,13% 0,42% -0,28% 0,76% 3,397 ***
Sample Count 92 92
78
Table 16
This table reports the way banks adjusted to new capital ratios, from 2008 to 2013. Sample consists of
the largest 184 banks in the world, all with total assets in 2008 above USD 40 bn. The sample is split
between banks where customer loans exceed customer deposits and banks where customer deposits
surpass customer loans. The indicator is computed as a ratio of loans over deposits, less 1. Higher
Loans banks have a positive indicator, whereas Higher Deposits banks have a negative indicator.
T-stat and last column refer to a two-sided test of difference in means, being H0 the hypothesis that the
population means are equal, against the alternative H1 that the difference between population means is
different from zero. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Higher Loans Higher Deposits
Variable mean stdev mean stdev t-stat
Initial Capital Ratio 13,58% 12,39% 14,38% 8,62% -0,364
RWA effect 1,81% 10,13% -4,15% 7,26% 3,276 ***
Capital effect 2,11% 9,10% 5,59% 5,10% -2,335 **
Final Capital Ratio 17,50% 12,48% 15,82% 6,04% 0,866
Equity effect 2,48% 4,36% 2,11% 2,72% 0,498
Earnings effect 1,27% 8,95% 7,34% 5,11% -4,111 ***
Dividends effect -1,40% 1,97% -2,13% 2,26% 1,650 *
Other Core Tier 1 effect 1,33% 7,41% -1,36% 3,33% 2,377 **
Non Core Tier 1 Effect -0,41% 1,60% -0,85% 2,21% 1,125
Tier 2 effect -1,16% 2,12% 0,48% 2,09% -3,741 ***
Credit Risk Effect 1,79% 9,01% -3,70% 7,04% 3,273 ***
Market Risk effect 0,14% 0,59% -0,19% 0,67% 2,508 **
Operational Risk effect -0,25% 1,21% -0,40% 0,83% 0,715
cross effect 0,12% 0,48% 0,14% 0,38% -0,133
Impairment effect 0,26% 0,47% -0,05% 0,15% 4,617 ***
CR Quality effect 1,51% 5,76% 0,90% 8,78% 0,402
CR Volume effect 0,02% 5,51% -4,56% 6,91% 3,545 ***
MR Quality effect 0,16% 0,96% -0,05% 0,69% 1,212
MR Volume effect -0,01% 0,74% -0,13% 0,54% 0,901
Sample Count 88 96
79
Table 17
This table reports the way banks adjusted to new capital ratios, from 2008 to 2013. Sample consists
of the largest 184 banks in the world, all with total assets in 2008 above USD 40 bn. The sample is
split evenly using the average ROE ratio during the period (unweighted). Higher ROE banks had a ratio
above 6.88%.
T-stat and last column refer to a two-sided test of difference in means, being H0 the hypothesis that the
population means are equal, against the alternative H1 that the difference between population means is
different from zero. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Higher ROE Lower ROE
Variable mean stdev mean stdev t-stat
Initial Capital Ratio 12,85% 2,47% 15,15% 14,70% -1,282
RWA effect -4,27% 6,29% 1,67% 10,66% -3,364 ***
Capital effect 6,18% 4,77% 1,67% 8,91% 3,158 ***
Final Capital Ratio 14,76% 2,92% 18,49% 13,15% -2,231 **
Equity effect 2,32% 3,58% 2,25% 3,63% 0,092
Earnings effect 7,35% 8,07% 1,52% 6,32% 3,884 ***
Dividends effect -2,75% 2,40% -0,82% 1,29% -5,017 ***
Other Core Tier 1 effect -0,94% 4,90% 0,80% 6,49% -1,465
Non Core Tier 1 Effect -0,16% 1,16% -1,11% 2,42% 2,543 **
Tier 2 effect 0,36% 2,00% -0,96% 2,31% 2,945 ***
Credit Risk Effect -3,70% 5,81% 1,55% 9,85% -3,213 ***
Market Risk effect -0,22% 0,61% 0,17% 0,64% -2,954 ***
Operational Risk effect -0,54% 0,63% -0,11% 1,28% -2,176 **
cross effect 0,19% 0,37% 0,07% 0,48% 1,327
Impairment effect 0,02% 0,24% 0,18% 0,46% -2,109 **
CR Quality effect 0,94% 2,89% 1,45% 10,19% -0,378
CR Volume effect -4,66% 4,61% -0,08% 7,60% -3,594 ***
MR Quality effect -0,01% 0,68% 0,11% 0,97% -0,678
MR Volume effect -0,21% 0,53% 0,06% 0,72% -2,071 **
Sample Count 92 92
80
Table 18
This table reports the way banks adjusted to new capital ratios, from 2008 to 2013. Sample consists of
the largest 184 banks in the world, all with total assets in 2008 above USD 40 bn. The sample is split
evenly using the rate of gross loan growth between 2008 and 2013. Total loans were computed in USD
terms. Fast loan growth banks grew more than 13.9% during the period, or 2.64% compounded per year.
T-stat and last column refer to a two-sided test of difference in means, being H0 the hypothesis that the
population means are equal, against the alternative H1 that the difference between population means is
different from zero. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Higher Loan Growth Lower Loan Growth
Variable mean stdev mean stdev t-stat
Initial Capital Ratio 14,55% 12,12% 13,45% 8,79% 0,503
RWA effect -5,61% 8,95% 3,01% 7,31% -5,089 ***
Capital effect 7,20% 8,48% 0,65% 4,33% 4,908 ***
Final Capital Ratio 16,14% 12,25% 17,11% 6,15% -0,507
Equity effect 2,72% 3,16% 1,84% 3,95% 1,190
Earnings effect 7,67% 5,64% 1,21% 8,33% 4,434 ***
Dividends effect -2,43% 2,06% -1,13% 2,05% -3,037 ***
Other Core Tier 1 effect -1,05% 5,77% 0,90% 5,70% -1,631
Non Core Tier 1 Effect -0,14% 1,29% -1,14% 2,34% 2,657 ***
Tier 2 effect 0,43% 2,10% -1,03% 2,17% 3,269 ***
Credit Risk Effect -4,95% 8,08% 2,79% 7,00% -4,923 ***
Market Risk effect -0,23% 0,74% 0,17% 0,49% -3,087 ***
Operational Risk effect -0,62% 1,28% -0,04% 0,55% -3,059 ***
cross effect 0,18% 0,53% 0,08% 0,30% 1,111
Impairment effect 0,02% 0,23% 0,18% 0,47% -2,091 **
CR Quality effect 1,00% 5,65% 1,39% 8,97% -0,252
CR Volume effect -5,97% 3,86% 1,23% 6,96% -6,390 ***
MR Quality effect 0,07% 1,09% 0,03% 0,46% 0,243
MR Volume effect -0,29% 0,74% 0,14% 0,45% -3,524 ***
Sample Count 92 92
81
Table 19
This table reports the way banks adjusted to new capital ratios, from 2008 to 2013. Sample consists of
the largest 184 banks in the world, all with total assets in 2008 above USD 40 bn. The sample is split
evenly using the total capital ratio in 2008. Higher 2008 Capital Ratio banks had a ratio above 12.35%.
T-stat and last column refer to a two-sided test of difference in means, being H0 the hypothesis that the
population means are equal, against the alternative H1 that the difference between population means is
different from zero. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Higher 08 Cap Ratio Lower 08 Cap Ratio
Variable mean stdev mean stdev t-stat
Initial Capital Ratio 17,31% 14,20% 10,69% 0,96% 4,191 ***
RWA effect -3,59% 10,97% 0,99% 6,34% -2,542 **
Capital effect 5,08% 9,51% 2,77% 4,38% 1,589
Final Capital Ratio 18,79% 12,96% 14,45% 3,29% 2,562 **
Equity effect 2,27% 3,26% 2,29% 3,92% -0,027
Earnings effect 6,94% 6,41% 1,94% 8,28% 3,264 ***
Dividends effect -2,22% 2,51% -1,34% 1,61% -2,050 **
Other Core Tier 1 effect -0,84% 6,08% 0,69% 5,43% -1,270
Non Core Tier 1 Effect -0,91% 2,37% -0,36% 1,37% -1,407
Tier 2 effect -0,16% 2,61% -0,44% 1,83% 0,598
Credit Risk Effect -3,15% 10,11% 0,99% 5,80% -2,497 **
Market Risk effect -0,11% 0,80% 0,06% 0,46% -1,284
Operational Risk effect -0,45% 1,38% -0,20% 0,43% -1,343
cross effect 0,12% 0,54% 0,14% 0,27% -0,248
Impairment effect 0,03% 0,31% 0,17% 0,42% -1,920 *
CR Quality effect 0,53% 10,19% 1,86% 2,78% -0,983
CR Volume effect -3,70% 7,93% -1,03% 4,80% -2,010 **
MR Quality effect 0,03% 1,10% 0,07% 0,43% -0,275
MR Volume effect -0,14% 0,85% -0,01% 0,31% -1,023




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Capital Effects It is the numerator effect of the ratio. It represents the change
in the amount of regulatory capital.
Equity effect The change in capital ratio due to the increase or decrease of equity,
usually through the floating of new shares. A positive value means
a capital increase. Negative values are associated with share buybacks.
Earnings effect The change in capital ratio due to the earnings of the year. A
positive value means the bank had profits.
Dividends effect he change in capital ratio due to the distribution of dividends. The
effect is always negative, as it represents a reduction of equity.
Other Core Tier 1 effect The change in capital ratio due to changes in reserves or adjustments,
like minority interests, goodwill or deferred tax assets.
Non Core Tier 1 Effect The change in capital ratio due to the increase or decrease of non-Core
Tier 1 instruments, like non-cumulative preferred shares. A positive
value means the floating of new instruments.
Tier 2 effect The change in capital ratio due to the increase or decrease of Tier 2
instruments, like subordinated loans. A positive value means the
floating of new instruments.
RWA Effects It is the denominator effect of the ratio. A lower RWA will help
banks to fulfil capital requirements.
Credit Risk Effect It is the change in the total amount of credit risk weighted by the
correspondent risk weight. A positive number means more credit risk,
which can surge by added quantity (a volume effect), lower quality
(increase in the average risk weight) or lower impairment (as an increase
in impairment reduces the net volume of credit risk, for the same volume
of gross credit)
Market Risk effect It is the change in the total amount of market risk, measured as the
capital requirement for this type of risk multiplied by 12.5. A positive
number means more market risk, which can result from an increase in
the market portfolio (a volume effect) or from lower quality (increase
in the average risk weight). In almost all banks in the database, there is no
disclosure of the split of Market Risk capital requirements between trading
and banking book. Most of the impact should be on the Trading Book.
However, some risks, like foreign exchange, commodity and settlement,
are also computed for the Banking Book. My approach was to use the most
comprehensive measure, using Trading and Banking books.
Operational Risk effect It is the change in the total amount of operational risk, measured as the
capital requirement for this type of risk multiplied by 12.5. A positive
number means more operational risk.
cross effect The use of a chain decomposition creates always some residual effect
from the cross effect of the risks. It is a small number that can be ignored.
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Speed and Quality of bank adjustments to
target capital ratios
Gonçalo Leónidas Rocha





In this paper, I investigate the speed of adjustment and the quality of capital to fill the
gap between current capital ratios and bank internal capital targets.
If regulators ask for speed, they get quality capital from banks; however, if they ask
for capital, banks do not deliver speed, mainly when they are very profitable and can
count on future equity accumulation to fill the gap.
On average, capital accounts only for 26% of the adjustment effort to target ratios. I
also found a 0,47 yearly adjustment factor, meaning that banks adjust every year about
half of the distance they have between current capital ratio and the target value. This
value is consistent with an industry average optimal capital ratio of 15.2%, signifi-
cantly higher than minimum required.
Banks that adjust faster and with good quality tend to have a lower initial Tier 1 ratio,
high Return on Assets, riskier assets and be located in developed markets.
JEL Classification: G280
Keywords: Bank, Regulation, Capital Adequacy, Basel III
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1 Introduction
There is a significant body of literature discussing the existence of target capital struc-
tures, be it in banks or in non financial firms. The idea is not exempt from controversy,
mainly after the seminal work of Modigliani & Miller (1958) that presents the irrele-
vancy proposition. Only in the presence of market frictions could the capital structure
have some impact of the value of the firm. In the financial industry, no one seems to
claim that structure is irrelevant, and all Basel regulation, directed to capital adequacy,
supports a general consensus in that matter.
In this paper, I discuss the way banks adjust to a new environment where significant in-
creases in capital are required. Three main factors seem to contribute for the change in
capital structure. In the first place, after the shock of the global financial crisis of 2008,
banks may have realised they were underestimating risks; economic capital should be
higher, leading banks to reduce leverage. The second factor is the adjustment in the
asset side, due again to the shock waves of the global financial crisis. Here, the impact
is not obvious, as we witnessed a major divergence between banks facing significant
capital challenges and the ones, mainly in emerging markets, that profit from the situ-
ation to increase market share in global markets. Finally, regulators came aboard and
required more capital, even when banks are not willing to do so.
My approach is to study the dynamics of two variables: the degree of capital usage
and the speed of the adjustment.
In principle, regulators may prefer that banks adjust to the new requirements using
capital. However, the result is not so obvious. For instance, if leverage and risk are
close substitutes, banks may increase risk when leverage is limited by regulation below
their optimal level - Shrieves & Dahl (1992) support this theory (however, they found
this also happens for banks above the minimum requirements, and so regulation is not
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the only reason for the fine tuning of the mix; shareholders and managers preferences
must also play a role here). We found on a previous paper42 that a mandatory increase
in capital changed the ownership structure of the bank and, with that, the level of risk
appetite.
In this paper, I use an extended database, with more banks, spread for all geogra-
phies, and also using some privately owned banks. Instead of just presenting the path
banks use to fulfill required ratios, I also discuss the characteristics that contribute for
different speeds and capital usage.
In the second part of this paper, I review the literature on the existence of target capital
ratios, and on how banks approach those targets. In the third part, I will present the
database used in the paper and some characteristics of the data. The implementation
of the variables ”capital usage” and ”speed of adjustment” are discussed.
At part 4, on the methodology and empirical tests, I perform 3 tests on the data. The
first test is a linear regression, using capital usage and speed of adjustment as depen-
dent variables, in order to discuss what factors condition their behavior. My second
test combines both variables and tries to discuss which conditions might favour high
speed and high capital, and also what can contribute for the opposite behavior (low
speed and low capital). A probit test is used for that matter.
In the first two tests, I considered the capital ratio of 2013 to be the target ratio for
each bank. This might be a simplification, and so I use a possible estimation for the
banking industry target ratio, based on the yearly adjustment factor to that target. Some




Part five concludes and presents some take aways for regulation and avenues for future
research.
2 Review of the Literature
The leverage ratio has been researched in the literature for long, be it in financial or
non-financial companies. For instance Flannery & Rangan (2006) found that compa-
nies have a target leverage ratio and they tend to adjust one third of the gap each year.
They also found (but do not report) that firm characteristics affect the speed of adjust-
ment. Basel III sets a new dynamic target, as each year has a new level to be achieved
until 2019; however, in this case, banks cannot adjust slower, but they can do it faster
(or have a higher target - see for instance Shrieves & Dahl (1992) that find banks try
to maintain a buffer above regulatory minimum as a flexibility option). However, we
should bear in mind that a high buffer may mean two different things: on one hand, it
can be a “safety” stance from the bank (when running at below level is costly or the
access to capital markets is not quick or readily available); or it may just reflect the
riskiness of the bank, where economic capital is way above regulatory capital.
A study by Jokipii & Milne (2008) finds the adjustment speed to be higher in banks
(two thirds of the gap each year), which can be a consequence of regulatory pressure
or the fact that banks can more easily adjust their ratios on the asset side (banks have
a larger percentage of liquid assets when compared to non financial companies). The
paper also finds some relationship between adjustment and size. Large banks seem
to decrease the buffer in bad times, whereas smaller banks tend to increase the buffer.
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Putting crudely, we could say that smaller banks foresee a crisis coming and adjust their
loan policy in advance, lowering risks and economic capital. Since it is not thinkable
that large banks have lower predictive power, we have to look for other explanations,
like a lower capacity of adjustment or a higher reliance on the Government safety net
in case of need.
Memmel & Raupach (2010) use a monthly data sample of German banks to confirm the
higher speed of adjustment for banks, and also that privately owned banks adjust faster
than state owned or cooperative banks. I cannot find this results with my database.
The authors use the proportion of market risk in total Risk Weighted Assets as a proxy
for proprietary trading. Since I have a much wider database, I lack this information
for a significant part of the banks. As such, I used the net value of securities in banks
assets as a proxy and I could not find that relationship when speed of adjustment is
considered alone. However, I find a significant probability that a higher proportion of
securities in the balance sheet leads to higher speed and capital usage taken together.
The different conclusion may be due to the several roles securities play on the bank
balance sheet, to the existence of pledged securities, or to impairments.
Cohen & Scatigna (2014) address the issue of what instrument is responsible for the
adjustment. Using a database of 94 large global banks, the authors found that the bulk
of the adjustment towards new capital requirements was done with retained earnings
(less generous dividends) and much less with reductions in the risk profile of the assets.
Gropp & Heider (2009) finds that deposit insurance and capital requirements play a
secondary role on the capital structure of banks (mainly when they are close to mini-
mum requirements). According to the paper, the primary determinant is bank specific
and time invariant targets (call it culture). This evidence is supported by the fact that
very profitable banks, that pay generous dividends and have high market to book ratios
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(and so without any substantial cost to deal with the need to raise capital, or less flexi-
bility value), do have larger buffers. In this setting, banks behave like any non-financial
firm.
Francis & Osborne (2012) have an interesting and unique database: they use bank
specific regulation, or the capital adjustments required in the UK for each bank, taking
into account governance, risk management and market environment. This approach
is interesting as an 8% fixed threshold is not a good proxy for an unconstrained bank
(markets and regulators may be imposing higher levels). The study finds that loan
growth is positively associated with high target capital level, but not so with required
capital level. If a well capitalized bank has better chances of increasing the loan book,
this effect does not happen when the bank is still adjusting to the preferred target level.
A bank with a low capital target level will have the incentive to comply to the reg-
ulation with the lower quality capital accepted, like tier II instruments. A regulatory
imposition might lead to this type of behavior: high quality capital must be demanded
and, even so, banks can play with the level of assets or the risk weights.
3 Data and Summary Statistics
This database was already used in a previous paper43.
The data-set used here is compiled from annual reports and pillar 3 disclosures from
the largest banks in the world. In this sample, I consider all banks that, in the starting
year of 2008, have at least 40 billion US dollars of assets. In total, there are 215 bank-
43See Rocha (2015).
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ing groups complying to this criterion, from which I can work with 184. The remaining
banks have very little information (unfortunately, this is not a ”random” selection, as
banks with missing information are much less reliant on the markets for funding or
business).
Then, I computed two new variables: the degree of capital usage (the numerator)
instead of RWA (the denominator) to fill the gap; and the speed of adjustment, re-
vealing the pace of such adjustment.
The capital usage is the percentage of Tier 1 ratio change during the period that is
attributed to changes in the numerator. The computation is done like this:
capital usage =






= 1  T ier12008
T ier12013
(18)
In principle, capital usage should lie between 0% and 100%; however, since it can
contribute positively or negatively to the outcome, the variable has no bounds.
This method assumes the ratio in 2013 is the desired target44, which is a strong as-
sumption. Furthermore, the ratio may not even be desired, but the consequence of the
environment: a bank with significant losses may have a negative capital contribution.
The speed of adjustment weights each year the change in the capital ratio (as a per-
centage of the total change during the five year period) by a load factor that identifies
the year of the change. A change in 2009 has a weight of 5, whereas a change in 2010
has a weight of 4, and so on. A high number means a fast increase. The variable can
have a value in excess of 5, as there might be negative numbers in some years.
44I will relax this constraint in the next section.
92
In Table 21, I present a set of descriptive statistics of the data.
Table 21
This table reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in this paper. The source
and exact meaning of each variable is described in Annex 2.
Max Min Average Median # observ.
Asset Volatility 0,420 0,017 0,140 0,108 184
Capital usage 82,0% -80,9% 26,4% 27,0% 184
Creditor Rights 4,00 0,00 2,03 2,00 182
Emerging 45
European 80
Final Tier 1 127,9% 6,6% 13,9% 12,3% 184
GDP per capita 106 820 1 358 37 492 41 968 174
Initial Tier 1 125,6% 5,0% 10,9% 9,4% 184
Leverage 277,56 -66,76 21,18 16,93 184
Loan to Deposits Gap 27,25 -0,98 0,48 -0,03 183
Log of Asset Size 19,46 8,70 13,46 13,23 184
Power Owner Share 100,0% 5,0% 44,2% 34,4% 184
ROA 2,3% -6,5% 0,3% 0,3% 184
ROE 860,5% -616,0% 5,1% 6,9% 184
Securities 89,8% 3,6% 27,9% 24,8% 184
SIFI 2014 26
Speed of Adjustment 44,1 -80,2 3,0 3,4 184
Spread 5,7% -0,4% 1,7% 1,5% 184
Regulatory Tier 1 11,0% 8,5% 8,7% 8,5% 184
WGI 11,09 -4,42 5,94 7,29 184
Z Score 384,20 -0,46 46,27 30,55 184
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On average, banks increased their Tier 1 ratios by 3 percentage points during this
5-year period, and they used capital to fill 26,4% of the distance to their target Tier
1 ratio, which is quite a small figure. However, most banks already had Tier 1 ratios
aligned with the requirements from Basel III.
Speed of Adjustment tells that, on average, banks adjusted to the target level in 3 years.
Banks from Taiwan had no value for GDP per capita. The use of the Chinese fig-
ure is unsuitable and the World Bank does not compute a regional GDP for Taiwan
(however, the World Bank computes a regional GDP for Hong Kong...).
4 Methodology and Empirical Tests
Standalone effects
I have run a linear regression on the speed of adjustment. Results are presented on
Table 22. The first thing to note is that bank profitability decreases the speed of ad-
justment; we can see that on the negative coefficients of ROE and spread. It might
be counter-intuitive; however, profitable banks have a better expectation to fulfill the
target ratios without specific events, like capital issues or significant asset reshuffle.
The use of capital increases the speed, as it is probably the way to change the ratio
overnight. I run other regressions with the level of securities in the balance sheet and
we found no meaningful relationship. We might suspect that a significant part of the
security portfolio is already pledge (and thus not really available to sell) or with sig-
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nificant impairments through equity that banks are reluctant to bring to the P&L.
Another interesting note was the behavior of state owned banks (not reported). I would
expect some slower speed of adjustment. However, the numbers do not show that. We
have to bear in mind the significant number of sate owned banks in emerging markets,
where the profitability was very relevant during the period of analysis.
A linear regression was also made to explain the level of capital usage for the ad-
justment. Results are presented as Table 23.
In this case, the conclusions are more obvious. Profitability builds capital and so in-
creases the level of capital usage. A low initial Tier 1 ratio also calls for more capital,
maybe done through an equity-like issue, as the normal course of business would not
be enough to achieve the target.
More interesting is the size effect: largest banks tend to be listed, and the market called
for a quick recover of the ratios (and were available to provide the funding). Also bear
in mind that SIFI banks have higher targets.
A low WGI score is a proxy for emerging markets, and so the negative coefficient
represents a higher usage of capital from those banks. This is explained by the sig-
nificant increase in asset size during the period, where these banks suffered very little
from the global financial crisis. As such, only capital helped to build up ratios, as the
denominator was mainly pushing Tier 1 down.
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Combined effects
In the previous section, I study the impact of several bank and country characteristics
on the speed of adjustment and capital usage, on a standalone basis. I did not study
what type of characteristics could lead banks to simultaneously have a high speed of
adjustment and significant capital usage.
In this section, I combine both variables. In a way, regulators prefer banks to recover
capital ratios fast, using the most ”capital-like” instruments they can use.
I started by constructing 4 simple quadrants, divided by the median value for speed
of adjustment and capital usage. Then, I run a probit for the probability of a bank to
lie on the top quadrant (high speed of adjustment and high capital usage) and also on
the bottom quadrant (low speed of adjustment and low capital usage)45. The other two
quadrants were ignored. The results are presented as Table 24.
The first conclusion, largely expected, is that a high initial Tier 1 ratio reduces the
impetus to have a high speed and high capital contribution. The mirror effect is also
true: a low initial ratio increases the urgency of the adjustment, and with good quality
instruments. By the same token, a high Return on Assets increases the speed and qual-
ity of the adjustment, as the profitability of the banks helps to recover Tier 1; a low
ROA reduces the speed and quality of the adjustment.
Another factor that stands up as contributing for speed and quality is the volatility
of assets. However, this effect might be the result of the construction: as the volatility
was computed for the same period of the change in the ratio, there is a feed loop here.
45The names ”top quadrant” and ”bottom quadrant” are not exactly correct, but they are intuitive for
the behaviour.
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More interesting is the percentage of securities in the balance sheet. In line with the
findings of Memmel & Raupach (2010), I witness that banks with significant securi-
ties can adjust faster. However, I find this effect only when quality is also present. The
interpretation might be due to the construction of this test: the level of securities in the
balance sheet is largely irrelevant on average to the quality or the speed of adjustment.
However, banks that showed a significant higher speed and quality used all the means
they had to do so, and the level of securities helped on this. When speed of adjustment
and/or quality is not pursued or possible, the level of securities is less relevant.
For the same Tier 1 ratio (which is a variable also present in the Probit test), lower
leverage helps to increase speed and quality. This situation happens for banks with
more risky assets, and so the ratio of total assets to RWA is lower (or, more intuitive,













T ier 1 ratio
(19)
Summing up, banks with riskier assets need to adjust faster and with capital. Several
situations can lead to this: reduced exposure to safe securities, long term and/or re-
duced collateral for the loans, and so on. With this setup, it is more difficult for the
bank to expect that the passage of time or asset reshuffle can help to adjust the ratio.
Furthermore, riskier assets are linked to higher economic capital, and a probable longer
path to their preferred target ratio.
Consistent with the findings in a previous paper46, size seems not to induce banks




A final note to emerging market banks that seem to take more time and less quality
to adjust (eventually less pressed from capital markets and with better tail wind from
economic environment).
Estimating the industry target ratio
Until now, I used the observed Tier 1 ratio in 2013 as a proxy for the target ratio on that
same year. This assumption is probably quite strong. Banks may have internal target
ratios that they could not reach in a given year. Since I was considering that the 2013
capital level is the target, I was placing at the same level a bank that barely complies
with the regulatory minimum and another one that significantly surpasses that level.
There is an extensive literature confirming the existence of target capital ratios in finan-
cial and non financial sectors. In the banking industry, it is not only market pressure
(like rating) or strategy to command the target, as also regulation plays a binding role.
Banks cannot operate below regulatory capital, and should not operate away from eco-
nomic capital. We can say that available capital should be the higher number of the
two. However, a very tight linkage to that number can be considered a loss of flexibil-
ity, and markets might compensate banks for operating above strict minimum.
Some authors use a lambda coefficient to model the yearly adjustment for the gap
between current level and the desired target for next year. The following equation can
be considered (where K⇤ refers to the optimal or target level):
Ki,j+1  Ki,j =  (K⇤i,j+1  Ki,j) + ✏i,j+1 (20)
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However, something must be inferred about this lambda coefficient. It can be fixed for
all banks, which is what most authors use, as can be seen for instance on Flannery &
Rangan (2006) or Jokipii & Milne (2008). It might seem quite strong but it is more
apparent than true. In fact, the adjustment is done to an unobserved target: if the true
lambda for a bank is higher than our overall guess, it means that we are overestimating
the target capital level of that bank. If we let lambda to move among banks, we will
not be able to infer target levels. Since I am interested in the estimation of an industry
adjustment ratio, and not a bank specific ratio, bank idiosyncrasies are mainly noise
and should average to zero. Also, note that Roberts (2002) found that lambda is not
fixed but industry explains most of the difference among firms. Since I am are using
a single industry, the use of a fixed lambda should not impose significant bias on the
conclusions.
Let us assume that target ratios are a function of some bank, regulation and coun-
try characteristics, denoted by a vector Xi,j . Then it can be said that:
K
⇤
i,j+1 =  Xi,j (21)
Composing (20) and (21) and rearranging, we get:
Ki,j+1 = (1   )Ki,j +   Xi,j + ✏i,j+1 (22)
The results of regression (22) are presented in Table 25. I used firm fixed effects since,
when omitted, coefficients are severely biased (see Flannery & Rangan (2006) on this
particular topic). The estimation for banking lambda is 0.47, or 1 less the beta coeffi-
cient of the Ki, j variable.
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Given the average Tier 1 capital increase of 0,6% every year for our sample, this cor-
responds to a target Tier 1 ratio 1,27% above current levels, or 15,2% on average.
Larger banks seem to increase capital ratios slowly, whereas significant loan provi-
sion in the past tends to command higher increases in Tier 1 capital afterwards. High
Return on Assets ratio tends to decrease the pace of Tier 1 accumulation.
It is also interesting to find a positive coefficient on the Output Gap variable, sup-
porting the idea that bank capital is pro-cyclical: it tends to increase more when the
economy is booming. This seems to be obvious, but is not. In fact, before the financial
crisis of 2007-08, most research47 found the opposite effect, pointing to a ”defensive”
stance from the banks: when the economy is booming, banks can safely run with less
excess capital. After the crisis, banks have to increase capital, and cannot ”crowd-out”
the cycle with less capital, as they used to do.
The coefficient of the year is also positive and significant, consistent with an accel-
eration of capital build-up.
In Table 26, I split the sample between European and Non European banks. The
results are striking. The lambda coefficient is much higher in Europe48. This may
represent a lower target or a higher pace. The coefficient for the Year is also higher in
Europe, showing a faster acceleration.
Some variables lose significance in the European group, as there is much less vari-
ance inside the sample, like the Emerging dummy, Creditors Rights, Asset Size or the
47See Jokipii & Milne (2008), Ayuso et al. (2004), Lindquist (2004) and Stolz & Wedow (2011).
This last paper uses a database from 1993 to 2004.
48Remember that lambda is 1 minus the Ki,j coefficient.
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Z Score.
The Output Gap is very significant and positive in Europe, contrasting with no sig-
nificance in their Non European counterparts. One possible interpretation is the con-
sistence in Europe that capital ratios are bound to increase, and so every good opportu-
nity, like a better economic environment, should be used to fill the target. On the other
hand, Non European banks are less consistent on this respect. A favourable economic
environment means less credit risk. Economic capital is certainly lower, and banks
seem to use that to reduce the ”observed” buffer to regulatory levels.
From Table 27, it is evident that European banks showed a much faster pace during
the period of analysis. From a evident lower level in 2008, European banks managed
to surpassed their Non European counterparts by 2013. In this last year, Non European
banks showed even a slight average decrease in their Tier 1 capital ratio. However, due
to a lower estimated target Tier 1 ratio, Non European banks are closer to fulfil the gap.
For the European banks, another year with the pace of 2013 is sufficient to meet the
target required in 2013.
These findings are consistent with the idea that banks have significant buffers on top of
the minimum required capital level. In this post-crisis years, banks seem not to profit
from good economic conditions to reduce the buffer.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper, I investigate the speed of adjustment and the quality of capital to fill the
gap between current capital ratios and bank internal capital targets. The existence of
optimal capital targets, way above the minimum regulatory requirements, seems to find
support in the literature.
When taken in a standalone basis, we see a divergent pattern: if regulators ask for
speed, they get quality capital from banks49; however, if they ask for capital, banks do
not deliver speed, mainly when they are very profitable and can count on future equity
accumulation to fill the gap.
On average, capital accounts only for 26% of the adjustment effort to target ratios.
This seems a very low figure, maybe explained by a very difficult period of analysis
(with economic recession in several countries) and the generous time frame given by
Basel III. Size and the SIFI status help to achieve a better quality adjustment. However,
they are not meaningful if regulators want speed and quality together.
Banks that adjust fast and with good quality tend to have a lower initial Tier 1 ratio
(in 2008), high Return on Assets, riskier assets and be located in developed markets.
I have also tried to estimate the yearly adjustment of the banking industry towards
optimal target ratios. I found a 0,47 adjustment factor, meaning that banks adjust every
year close to half of the distance they have between current capital ratio and the target
value for the same indicator. This value is consistent with an industry average optimal
capital ratio of 15.2%, significantly higher than minimum required.
49It is easier to increase ratios with equity issues than by reshuffling assets. This argument is used by
Admati & Hellwig (2013) to criticize strongly the option from Basel III to give a very large time frame,
until 2019, to strengthen capital.
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Capital ratios seem to be pro-cyclical after the financial crisis of 2007-2008, a struc-
tural change when compared to the research produced before the crisis. In my view,
banks can no longer profit from a positive economic cycle to reduce the effort in their
endogenous effort to adjust ratios.
European banks adjusted much faster during the period of analysis, being able to re-
cover from an initial lower ratio and even surpass the level of their Non European
counterparts. The pace was even accelerating during the period.
As a take-away for regulation, it seems that speed is the variable to demand, as qual-
ity comes with it. When Basel III decided to be generous with timing, markets were
depressed and there were reasonable doubts that most banks could recover capital fast
and all at the same time. Now that capital markets reopened for banks, regulation
seems a non-binding requirement, as banks run at much higher levels and adjust much
faster than needed, due to their own economic capital assessment or to the value posted
on flexibility or on the capacity to resist in a downturn.
For future research, it is interesting to model bank individual target ratios and try to




This table reports results of a linear regression of speed of adjustment, as the de-
pendent variable, on several regressors. Sample consists of the largest 184 banks in
the world, all with total assets in 2011 above USD 40 bn. Statistics are based on
annual data for the years 2008 to 2013. The meaning of all variables is detailed on
Appendix 2. T-stats for each coefficient are reported in parenthesis. *, ** and ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Speed of Adjustment Fixed Effects
Intercept -0,5674
(-0,1270)
Capital usage 6,4105 ** 0,0312 **
(2,3840) (2,1730)
Asset Volatility 9,0789 0,3840
(1,2770) (0,8730)
Spread -167,6196 ** 0,0993 *
(-2,4090) (-1,6580)
Log of Asset Size 0,3762 0,0849 *
(1,2580) (1,7340)
Leverage -0,0678 * 0,1325
(-1,7000) (-1,7000)
ROE -3,4516 *** 0,0032 ***
(-3,3380) (-2,9910)
Power Owner FE No Yes
Statistics
R Square 0,1305 0,1864
F Statistic 4,4270 *** 2,1000 ***
# Independent variables 6 18
# Degrees of Fredom 177 165
# Observations 184 184
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Table 23
This table reports the results of a linear regression of capital usage, as the dependent
variable, on several regressors. Sample consists of the largest 183 banks in the
world (one bank, Bank Nederlandse Gemeenten, has no deposits, and so the Loan
to Deposits gap cannot be calculated), all with total assets in 2011 above USD 40
bn. Statistics are based on annual data for the years 2008 to 2013. The meaning
of all variables is detailed on Appendix 2. T-stats for each coefficient are reported
in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively. 1 observation deleted due to missingness.
Base Model Fixed Effects
Intercept 0,1676
1,4320
Speed of Adjustment 0,0032 * 0,0032 *
1,7150 1,7170
Asset Volatility 0,2024 0,2199
1,0920 1,1620
Initial Tier 1 -0,1138 -0,3134 *
-0,7740 -1,7950
Loan to Deposits Gap -0,0099 -0,0084
-1,5420 -1,2710
Log of Asset Size 0,0130 * 0,0159 *
1,7040 1,9060
ROE 0,0362 ** 0,0448 **
2,0000 2,4780
ROA 6,8040 *** 6,6558 ***
3,9970 3,8350
WGI -0,0234 *** -0,0232 ***
-5,0730 -4,7740
Z Score 0,0004 0,0005 *
1,2890 1,7740
Power Owner FE No Yes
R Square 0,3854 0,4463
F Statistic 12,0500 *** 6,1790 ***
# Independent variables 9 21
# Degrees of Freedom 173 161
# Observations 183 183
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Table 24
This table reports the results of a probit test on the quadrant each bank lies on its
adjustment to the target levels. The top quadrant includes banks that revealed an above
median speed of adjustment and also above median usage of capital. The bottom
quadrant includes banks that revealed a below median speed of adjustment and also
below median usage of capital. Sample consists of the largest 184 banks in the world,
all with total assets in 2011 above USD 40 bn. Statistics are based on annual data for
the years 2008 to 2013. The meaning of all variables is detailed on Appendix 2. T-stats
for each coefficient are reported in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
top quadrant bottom quadrant
estimate z value estimate z value
(Intercept) 6,5750 1,1520 5,7900 0,8200
Asset Volatility 4,8980 3,1260 *** -2,2620 -1,3570
Creditors Rights 0,2383 1,6670 * -0,0118 -0,0840
Emerging 0,6452 0,9350 -4,9910 -2,0870 **
European -0,3619 -0,8400 -0,1261 -0,3540
GDP per capita 0,0000 2,0390 ** 0,0000 -1,1000
Initial Tier 1 -29,4200 -4,2450 *** 17,2500 2,8960 ***
Leverage -0,0436 -2,2720 ** 0,0073 0,9020
Loan to Deposits Gap -0,1423 -0,7020 -0,0115 -0,2320
Log of Asset Size -0,0121 -0,1460 -0,1067 -1,4030
State owned 0,0612 0,1630 0,0861 0,2320
ROA 69,8600 2,3850 ** -67,5500 -2,5330 **
ROE -0,8209 -1,2940 0,2832 0,9720
Securities 3,9740 3,0930 *** -0,7250 -0,6490
SIFI 2014 1,1250 1,2250 0,4782 0,4280
Regulatory tier 1 -83,8700 -1,2980 -62,5600 -0,7640
Z Score -0,0005 -0,1780 0,0017 0,6400
AIC 172,75 184,21
# observations 171 171
(13 observations deleted due to missingness on both tests)
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Table 25
This table reports the results of the regression in equation (4). The Tier 1 ratio of any
given year (Ki,j+1) is estimated based on the previous year Tier 1 ratio (Ki,j) and a set
of bank and country characteristics (Xi,j). Sample consists of the largest 184 banks in
the world, all with total assets in 2011 above USD 40 bn. Statistics are based on annual
data for the years 2008 to 2013. The meaning of all variables is detailed on Appendix
2. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Estimate t value
(Intercept) -5,93100 -3,87100 ***
Ki,j 0,53280 13,09000 ***
Asset Volatility -2,04700 -2,75800 ***
Creditor Rights 0,12670 2,52300 **
Emerging 0,28580 2,54600 **
European 0,21970 3,01100 ***
Leverage -0,00004 -1,25400
Loan to Deposits Gap 0,00045 0,45000
Loan Risk 0,08979 1,14500
Log of Asset Size -0,03958 -2,61500 ***
GDP per Capita 0,00000 -2,13700 **
ROA -0,61470 -6,80100 ***
Securities 0,03168 1,39000
Spread 0,31020 1,02300
Output Gap 0,00190 4,09500 ***
Year 0,00306 3,95200 ***
WGI 0,00116 0,29900
Z Score -0,00016 -1,51000
Multiple R-squared: 0,9253
F-statistic: 44,61
# Independent variables: 154
# Degrees of Freedom: 555
# Observations: 710
(210 observations deleted due to missingness)
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Table 26
This table reports the results of the regression in equation (4), split between European
and non-European banks. The Tier 1 ratio of any given year (Ki,j+1) is estimated based
on the previous year Tier 1 ratio (Ki,j) and a set of bank and country characteristics
(Xi,j). Sample consists of the largest 184 banks in the world, all with total assets
in 2011 above USD 40 bn. Statistics are based on annual data for the years 2008 to
2013. The meaning of all variables is detailed on Appendix 2. *, ** and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
European Non European
Estimate t value Estimate t value
(Intercept) -14,50000 -6,17500 *** -4,36500 -1,90100 *
Ki,j 0,24470 3,62000 *** 0,60090 12,44700 ***
Asset Volatility -0,91600 -2,31700 ** 0,96450 3,51600 ***
Creditor Rights 0,06503 1,93900 * 0,16600 3,20500 ***
Emerging 0,07590 1,16500 -0,33370 -3,88700 ***
Leverage -0,00002 -0,60800 -0,00038 -0,84800
Loan to Deposits Gap 0,00240 1,53700 0,00000 0,00300
Loan Risk 0,11940 1,29200 0,01756 0,10000
Log of Asset Size -0,01944 -0,92900 -0,05610 -2,60600 ***
GDP per Capita 0,00000 -1,17500 0,00000 -1,00500
ROA -0,47990 -3,84700 *** -0,65150 -3,81400 ***
Securities 0,04261 1,28500 0,02665 0,95000
Spread 0,07064 0,11500 0,46550 1,57300
Output Gap 0,00250 3,57200 *** 0,00087 1,41000
Year 0,00731 6,20400 *** 0,00224 1,92100 *
WGI 0,00763 1,43500 0,00040 0,07900
Z Score 0,00018 1,46600 -0,00135 -5,78200 ***
Multiple R-squared: 0,7461 0,9765
F-statistic: 9,741 133,3
# Independent variables: 89 77
# Degrees of Freedom: 295 247
# Observations: 385 325
# Observations deleted: 15 195
108
Table 27
This table presents a summary of the findings of adjustments speeds between European
and Non European banks. In this table, lambda is computed from the regression coef-
ficient of Ki,j from tables 5 and 6. Gap to target Tier 1 ratio is simply the ratio between
the average adjustment and the lambda coefficient. Sample consists of the largest 184
banks in the world, all with total assets in 2011 above USD 40 bn. Statistics are based
on annual data for the years 2008 to 2013. The meaning of all variables is detailed on
Appendix 2.
All European Non European
lambda 0,4672 0,7553 0,3991
Average adjustment 0,593% 1,037% 0,251%
Average 2013 adjustment 0,564% 1,300% -0,002%
Gap to target Tier 1 ratio 1,268% 1,373% 0,628%
Average Tier 1 in 2008 10,93% 9,14% 12,31%
Average Tier 1 in 2013 13,89% 14,32% 13,56%





Asset Size Log of total assets in USD Bn. Numbers were collected from the
consolidated annual reports.
Asset Volatility Standard deviation of Asset Size, divided by the average As-
set Size, using fiscal year-end figures for the period 2008-2013.
Numbers were collected from the consolidated annual reports.
Capital Usage Percentage of the change in Tier 1 ratio that is explained by the
effect of the numerator. A more comprehensive explanation is
given on Data & Summary Statistics section.
Country Country of incorporation.
Emerging A dummy variable that assumes a value of 1 when the country of
incorporation is considered Emerging by the classification of the
IMF.
European A dummy variable that assumes a value of 1 when the country
of incorporation is in Europe. Countries in two continents were
placed where they have most of their land, and so Russia and
Turkey are considered non-European.
Final Tier 1 The ratio of Tier 1 capital reported by the bank for the fiscal year
of 2013. Numbers were collected from the consolidated annual
reports.
Leverage The ratio of total assets over total equity. Numbers were collected
from the consolidated annual reports.
Initial Tier 1 The ratio of Tier 1 capital reported by the bank for the fiscal year
of 2008. Numbers were collected from the consolidated annual
reports.
Loan Risk Total loan provision as a percentage of gross loan book. Numbers
were collected from the consolidated annual reports.
Loan to Deposits
gap
Net loans granted to clients as a percentage of total deposits from









Percentage economic rights of the largest shareholder of the bank,
provided it has at least 5% share. When that threshold is not met
by any single shareholder, the bank is considered owned by the
free float, and the percentage of free float is reported.
ROA The average Return on Assets of the bank for the period 2008-
2013. Numbers were collected from the consolidated annual re-
ports.
ROE The average Return on Equity of the bank for the period 2008-
2013. Numbers were collected from the consolidated annual re-
ports.
Securities Average (for the period 2008-2013) percentage of total assets rep-
resented by securities, including trade, available-for-sale, held-
to-maturity, fair value, hedging derivatives and repo portfolios.
Numbers were collected from the consolidated annual reports.
SIFI 2014 A dummy variable that assumes a value of 1 when the bank is in
the list of Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions in
2014. The list is published by FSB - Financial Stability Board
Speed of Adjust-
ment
A proxy for the number of years on average that banks took to
overcome the difference between the initial Tier 1 ratio and the
final Tier 1 ratio. The formula used is explained in detail on Data
& Summary Statistics section.
Spread For each year, the spread is computed as the Net Interest Margin
over Total Assets. The variable used here is the average spread
for the period 2008-2013. Numbers were collected from the con-
solidated annual reports.
Regulatory Tier 1 The ratio of Tier 1 capital required by Basel III ”fully loaded”. It
incorporates also the extra charges for Global SIFI - Systemically
Important Financial Institutions.
Z-Score See Boyd & Graham (1986). It is a score that represents the num-
ber of standard deviations of profits over total assets needed to
wipe out equity over total assets (assumes a normal distribution
of returns). A high score means a safer bank. See Appendix 4 of





Creditor Rights Creditor Rights Index, collected from Djankov & Shleifer (2007).
This variable measures the legal rights of the creditors against
defaulting debtors in each country.
WGI Index Worldwide Governance Indicator for each country prepared by
Kaufmann et al. (2010). The variable incorporates different is-
sues like accountability, violence, corruption, rule of law, quality
of regulation and government effectiveness.
GDP per capita Values in current USD. The source is the World Bank.
Output Gap Deviations of actual GDP from potential GDP as % of potential
GDP. The source is OECD. Data is only available for developed
countries.
Country variables assume the same number for all banks in the same country. We
do not use Chinese data to model banks from Taiwan or Hong Kong.
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